In the beginning, it was simple. Or at least it seemed that way from so many different national vantages that it was hard to dispute. The war in Asia had been a war between ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys,’ and while opinions in different places varied on who exactly to count among the good guys, in places as politically and socially diverse as China, Indonesia, the Soviet Union, India, the United States, Korea, and the Netherlands, there was strikingly little disagreement over who the bad guys had been, at least at the national level. Even as the fragile ‘anti-fascist’ alliance of the wartime Allies (and their colonial subjects) gave way to the stark global oppositions of the Cold War, even as bitter colonial wars flared up in Vietnam, Indonesia, and elsewhere, anti-colonial nationalist leaders, (former) imperialists, peasants, government officials, businessmen, capitalists and communists around the globe - including a substantial number of Japan’s own citizens - could agree on this as few other things: Imperial Japan had been the villain of wartime Asia. Promising to lead Japan and Asia to a brighter future free of Western domination, but harbouring a hyper-imperialist and ‘ultra-nationalist’ sense of racial and cultural superiority and a brutal indifference to human life and dignity, the marauding Japanese - like their fascist allies in Europe - had brought only oppression, death and destruction to Asia and, ultimately, to themselves. Against these enemies of civilization, freedom, and progress, war with the Western Allies and resistance from the peoples of Asia had been the only possible recourse.

There were, of course, from the beginning, major differences in how the war was narrated, interpreted, and explained. The early, momentous decision of the American occupation authorities to retain the Japanese emperor, with a corresponding narrative that essentially included him as one of the war’s ‘good guys’, provoked dissent worldwide, and - as noted by several of the contributors to this special issue - left a deeply ambiguous legacy on the question of Japanese war responsibility within Japan itself. Another area of immediate disagreement involved characterizations of Japan’s Western opponents. In such venues as the Tokyo war crimes trials, spokesmen for the victorious Western powers - carrying on in the vein of Allied wartime propaganda - comfortably cast the Asia-Pacific War in the black and white terms of a struggle of ‘civilization’ versus ‘barbarism’, of ‘democracy’ versus ‘fascism’, of ‘freedom’ versus ‘tyranny’. But while they largely agreed with Allied characterizations of wartime Japan, many outside the West, as well as those to the left of the political spectrum the world over, were more skeptical regarding the West’s own aims and motives in Asia before, during, and after the war. Missing from this story, for them, was an acknowledgement of the fundamentally imperialist identity of the combatants on both sides, and the fundamental nature of the
Contents #38

The Asia-Pacific War: history & memory
1, 4, 5 Nations in the looking-glass: the war in changing retrospect, 1945-2005 / Ethan Mark
3 The politics of memory / Takuo David Hymans
6 War and the colonial legacy in recent South Korean scholarship / Kyu Hyun Kim
7 Between the national and the transnational: Li Xianglan/Yamaguchi Yoshiko and pan-Asianism / Yimian Wang
8 On occupied China / Poshek Fu
9 The lament of progressivism: voicing war responsibility in postwar Japan / Rikki Kersten
10 Workers at war: class formation in wartime Chongqing / Joshua H. Howard
11 Neither victors nor victims: transplanted/suppressed memories of the Sino-Japanese War in postwar Taiwan / Mike Shu-chi Lan
12 Memorizing the Tokyo air raids / Cary Karacas
13 The memory wars: Japan, China and Asia’s future / Peter King
14 A slow remembering: China’s memory of the war against Japan / Rana Mitter
15 Militarization of nutrition in wartime Japan / Katarzyna J. Cereńka
16 The nation’s path interrupted: the Pacific War in Philippine history textbooks / Portia L. Reyes
17 Catastrophe on Peleliu: islanders’ memories of the Pacific War / Stephen C. Murray
18 A nightmare in the making: war, nation and children’s media in Japan, 1891-1945 / Owen Griffiths
19 Anatomy of the Yūshikan war museum: educating Japanese youth? / Takashi Yoshida
20 Negotiating colonialism: Taiwan literature during the Japanese occupation / Lin Pei-Yin
21 Connecting the experiences of the Sino-Japanese and Asia-Pacific Wars / Ethan Mark
22 Borneo constituencies: Japanese rule and its legitimation / Remco Raben
23 ‘If this self is cultivated, …’ - some remarks on philosophy and politics in wartime Japan / Christian Uhl

International Institute for Asian Studies
24 - 25 International Convention of Asia Scholars 4 in Shanghai
26 - 27 The future of Asia: cross-cultural conversations in history / Barbara Watson Andaya
28 - 29 IIAS fellows
28 IIAS research programmes, networks & initiatives
28 Energy Programme Asia / Mehdi Parviz Amrah
29 Socio-Centric Marginalization in Asia / Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner
30 Seeking knowledge unto Qum: the education of Indonesian Shi’i ustadhs / Zulkifli
31 The heart of Borneo: a challenge for social scientists / Marion Osseneweier and Gerard A. Persoon
32 Borneo constituencies: Japanese rule and its legitimation / Remco Raben
33 Towards social stability and democratic governance in Central Eurasia: challenges to regional security / Irina Morozova
34 Illegal butlicit: transnational flows and permissive politics in Asia / Willem van Schendel
35 Books received
36 The future of rural income and rice production in China / Merritt van den Berg, Huib Hengsdijk, Wang Guanghua, Joost Wolf, Martin van Ittersum, Reimund Roetter
37 Announcements
38 - 39 International conferences agenda

Asia scholars as intermediaries between East and West

U ntil very recently, many scholars had the idea that Asian Studies was a west- ern endeavour. However, looking at the origin of the participants at ICAS we see that half of them were from Asia and the other half from the rest of the world, living proof that Asian Studies is and will increasingly become an Asian exercise.

One of the most prominent effects of the return of Asian Studies to its source is that several research traditions which have strong regional anchoring, the Anglo-Saxon, the South Asian, Chinese and continental European, will meet in Asia on a level playing field. The founding of an agile and mobile Asian Institute for Advanced Studies in Beijing could lead to a platform in which new ideas emanating from the fusing of these rich research traditions can blossom. To give a higher profile to Asian Studies in Asia, I hope that the initiative of CASS to form an Asian Alliance for Asian Studies will materialize in the course of next year.

Looking at the situation in Europe, a complicated picture presents itself. Recently, Potocki, the Euro-Commissioner of Research, pleaded for a European approach and cooperation in all fields of study. So the number of students from Asia in the western world has reached its zenith and their numbers are dropping. Within one or two decades Asia will be more than self-sufficient in educating not only its own intelligentsia, but also many other students from the rest of the world who will find the high quality and low cost of education in Asia most attractive.

We, as Asia scholars, never had to be convinced of the importance of Asia. Our role will be to act as intermediaries between East and West amidst converging research traditions in the emerging global research landscape. Some representatives from Asian Studies in Europe have tried hard in the past decade to make this come true, but if we look at the reality, we see the crumbling of Asian Studies at universities all over Europe. There is still not enough willingness to view Asian Studies at a European, let alone global, level.

What we see, just as in the US and Australia, is a mad scramble for Asian students who are shortsightedly considered as means to prop up the budgets of universities. Actually, the number of students from Asia in the western world has reached its zenith and their numbers are dropping. Within one or two decades Asia will be more than self-sufficient in educating not only its own intelligentsia, but also many other students from the rest of the world who will find the high quality and low cost of education in Asia most attractive.

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Sixty years after the collapse of the Japanese New Order in East Asia, the ghosts of empire and war continue to haunt the region. As Tokyo lobbies for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, demands for apology, compensation, and the forthright teaching of history simmer in the media, courts, civil societies and legislatures of affected nations. With the region's future once again uncertain, the conflict of six decades ago is assuming greater significance in its international relations.

Much of the current acrimony has its roots in the imperious nature of the post-war settlement. As the authors in this sixty-year retrospective point out, those wishing to reopen the book on wartime history and post-war official memory must first dig through successive layers of political imperatives: superpower confrontation, civil war, decolonisation, nation-building. Suffice to note here that many Asian grievances went unheeded at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, dubbed by one critic 'a white man's tribunal'; that western governments waived their citizens' rights to compensation in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, where Japan emerged as the essential Asian ally in containing communism; and that the reestablishment of official ties between Japan and the Republic of Korea (1965) and the People's Republic of China (1972) focused on diplomatic recognition (not Taiwan) and what Japan could do to aid economic development – the less said of the 'unfortunate period' the better. Thus all seemed well, at least at the level of official diplomacy.

Silence on the war did not extend to Japanese domestic politics, especially following rapprochement with the PRC and the recusal of the US in Vietnam. The post-war battle over remembering and forgetting the war pit the Japan Teachers Union against the Ministry of Education; partisans in the Socialist and Communist parties against proponents of big power status in the Liberal Democratic Party; students and citizens' groups and much of the intelligentsia against the established centre of political power. What was contested – as always – was contemporary: the security alliance with the United States, rearmament, revision of the constitution's war-renouncing Article IX, control over education, political careers that reached back into wartime. Recalling the history of Japanese aggression in Asia aided neither the LDP government's legitimacy nor its cause of rearming Japan in the Cold War – a point not lost on the left opposition.

Beijing entered this heated debate in 1982, precipitating the first in a long series of diplomatic incidents between Japan and its East Asian neighbours over 'the correct interpretation of history'. At issue in 1982 was a Ministry of Education policy to replace 'invasion' with 'advance' into China in a high-school history textbook; textbooks have been central to the controversy ever since: 'Why does our nation stray from the world-stage during big events?' asks Fujisaka Nobukatsu of the private but officially well-connected Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform: 'Our history education is wrong. Since the end of World War II, we have been taught that our country was a villain in the War: The Japanese have lost confidence in their ability to determine what direction the country should take'. The Ministry's approval of the Society's text for school use led to South Korea recalling its ambassador and placing an embargo on Japanese pop culture in 2001. History textbooks 'offensive to Chinese feelings' were at the core of the petition signed by over twenty million Chinese to deny Japan a seat on the UN Security Council in 2005.

Why is a war that ended sixty years ago so prominent on the international stage? We're back to Hobbes.

Gain. In staking its claims for future regional leadership, Beijing has found in the legacy of invasion and atrocity a moral club to beat down its rival. Around the region, competing versions of the war buttress claims to territory and energy reserves disputed by Japan, Russia, the PRC and South Korea. One also suspects indigenous competitors to Hello Kitty to be active in any boycotts.

Safety. The war’s use as domestic political capital extends well beyond Japan. Caroline Rose presents evidence in Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations that Deng Xiaoping raised the stakes on Japan's whitewashing of history in 1982 to bolster legitimacy for himself and his reform agenda because the 'old guard' in the People’s Liberation Army – still in position to block Deng’s final consolidation of power – were blasting his pragmatism as harmful to ideology, discipline, and morale, and the foreign policy that accompanied the four modernisations as subservient. 'By taking tough positions, Chinese leaders demonstrate their nationalist credentials and win vitally important domestic political support... No Chinese politician can afford to appear soft on “hegemony” or “imperialism” and expect to stay in power' (David Shambaugh on PRC succession politics, International Security, 21-2).

Reputation. Moral authority is essential to political power; governments want historiography to foster pride in the nation and loyalty to the state. Nor is it simply a matter of top-down manipulation. As Ernest Renan observed: ‘Getting history wrong is an essential part of being a nation’. The problem for international events such as war is that more than one nation will get the shared history wrong, while narratives for domestic consumption rarely please audiences abroad. Here theorists of globalisation overlook an important border-crossing commodity: offence. With the media's interest in sensationalism and the political utility of enemies real or imagined, it bodes ill for the future.

— Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651
The war in Asia was a showdown between imperialists over territories and peoples that neither side had a right to claim.

The first of these was a general tendency to explain Japanese wartime actions in terms of Japan's presumed 'exceptional' nature and/or cultural and institutional 'immaturity'. Even among the most thoughtful and informed observers, in different parts of the world—at different ends of the political spectrum—there was a common assumption that Japan's behaviour in Asia had been, first, unusual in its aggressive, and second, that this had been fostered, by a certain 'ineffectiveness' in Japan's development as a modern nation-state and society, a situation that had allowed, even encouraged, the persistence of certain 'pre-modern' or 'semimodern' attitudes in Japan. For example, that the imperial state had been a major culprit in determining Japan's disastrous course, monopolizing and dictating the terms of national loyalty, militarizing Japan's masses, as an inevitable consequence of fundamental social deficiencies and simplification of the wartime experience for political purposes while many eyes focused on Japan, distortion, manipulation and urgency that betrayed them as much more than a simple curiosity. Whatever their shared shortcomings and omissions, these competing historical narratives were invested with an energy and urgency that betrayed them as much more than a simple curiosity. Indeed it can be argued that where the Asia-Pacific war was concerned, the difficulty in moving beyond starkly opposed, simplistic narratives of villains and victims— or, in the case of state-approved textbooks, beyond a deafening and silence on the part of imperial Japan, any characteristic Japanese inability to deal in a sophisticated way with the past, but rather to the continuing, profoundly contentious political implications carried by these narratives in the making of persons and nations. In short, if Portia Reyes is correct that you characterized the war order— who your victims and villains were, what aspects of the system you identified as the true culprits of the war— was also, inevitably, a commentary on the postwar order, on where Japan should go from here.

All the more so in a cold war world in which stark national choices had to be made. If the global capitalist system in general and Japan's role in particular had been at heart the cause of the wartime fiasco, for example, then it hardly made sense to maintain a close postwar alliance with the capitalist U.S., or to be content with the relatively cosmetic changes the U.S. had made to the Japanese imperial system during its occupation— all the while continuing to maintain a dangerous distance between Japan and its Asian neighbours, most importantly China. And vice versa. Thus were postwar politics and historical narrative inexorably intertwined, leaving very little room for nuance or ambiguity, a situation in which the state and its representatives often took the easiest path by saying little or nothing at all. Gary Karaca's essay here, sketching the convoluted history of a monument to the victims of the U.S. firebombing, is a vivid illustration of the tortured, contested nature of such attempts at representation in postwar Japan. While fingers thus remained for the most part deservedly pointed at Japanese for failing to take an objective reckoning of their wartime past, it was also difficult to see the global postwar landscape of history and memory as an entirely byproduct of such collective approaches. Whatever their shared shortcomings and omissions, these competing historical narratives were invested with an energy and urgency that betrayed them as much more than a simple curiosity— was in fact globally endemic in a postwar, cold war world of nation-states attempting to (re)establish legitimacy and superpowers battling for new influence. The Tokyo war crimes trials offered a blatant early example— even now—providing ammunition to Japan's revisionist right wing— by insisting, against most of the historical evidence, on the existence of a long-term prewar Japanese plot to take over Asia and ultimately the world, while refusing to acknowledge any wrongdoing or culpability for the war on the side of the Western powers.

But there were more subtle transgressions as well. As historian John Dower revealed in a fiery 1975 critique of the postwar American Japan studies establishment, for example, it was more than coincidental that American scholars such as Reischauer had been 'notions of Japanese history and community, a mis- taken diet' on an otherwise steadily ascending path towards a successful, democratic modernity. For, as Dower showed, these scholars were convinced of the merits of the American liberal capitalist model in postwar Japan and the need to implement the West's vision for an independent Japan, and thus determined to not leave the writing of Japan's modern history to 'ideological', 'biased' left-wing Japanese scholars who, they believed, sought to employ history to undermine the U.S.-sponsored postwar order, the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and, ultimately, the American position in Asia.
Meanwhile, in the many new Asian nations emerging from the wartime wreckage, the subordination of historical narratives to the war period to post-war considerations and the ‘national interest’ was, if anything, more pronounced. For nationalist elites seeking to throw off colonial domination and consolidate their political hegemony in societies in which the colonial period, both before and after, had left socially divisive legacies along lines of class, culture, ethnicity, and politics, there was a high premium on stark, heroic ‘us’ versus ‘them’ accounts of Japanese ‘oppression’ versus national ‘resistance’ to it, an independence – along with the near universal postwar equation of anti-colonial nationalism with the world-historical forces of human liberation and progress – only provided further ammunition to the creation of black-and-white narratives, with the emergent anti-colonial nationalism as their heroic subject.

Within this uncompromising framework, there was little room to accommodate multiple experiences, meanings, and legacies. In places such as Indonesia, scholars and popular interpreters alike incorporated the Japanese occupation period into the new nationalist mythology as a sort of divinely ordained national trial by fire, from which the nation was destined to emerge like a boomerang against the returning Western imperialists, stronger and more united than ever. Prominent people who had openly supported the Japanese and were politically expendable, like Jorge Vargas in the Philippines, faced condemnation as ‘traitors’ and ‘collaborators’. But as Kyo Hyn Kim observes in this issue in the case of South Korea, the compromisingly close wartime association of many members of new dominant social classes with the Japanese state contributed to making the national leaders such as Sukharto and Park – was a subject that most contemporary students of history preferred to shy away from. Where the nationalist interaction with the Japanese had been too starkly ‘us’ versus ‘them’, in the case of Sukarno and Hatta in Indonesia – nationalist interpreters often sought to turn this sort of potentially divisive historical legacy into another nation-building strategy, by presenting wartime association with the Japanese as a purely strategic and ultimately fruitless maneuver, proof of the infallible political and historical sense of the nation’s leadership. The narrow, unforgiving parameters of ‘collaboration’ and ‘resistance’ allowed little room for anything in-between.

But how to contain the problem of ‘collaboration’ and secure nation-building lessons from the war experience when, at least from the start, few wartime narratives, the entire nation itself had been on the ‘wrong side’ in the war? As Mike Lani Shih Chi demonstrates here in the case of Taiwan, the answer was to import a nationalist mythology from the mainland, effectively and successfully to the Taiwanese people as part of their own wartime history in the process. Ironically, the exigencies of nation-building seeped into wartime narratives across the geographical and political divide of the Taiwan Straights as well. As Joshua Howard observes in his contribution to this issue, even in the ostensibly ‘workers state’ of the People’s Republic of China, narratives of unified national resistance against the Japanese served to obscure a dynamic wartime history of class struggle and contestation in the urban areas under nationalist control.

The war in the post-war period

In more recent times, as the standpoint of Chi, Kim, and other contributions to this special issue illustrate for different national contexts, the passage of the wartime generation from the political to the cultural sphere has, in many cases, left behind a sort of transnational legacy of our collective narratives and modern nation-building processes that continue to inflect the modern processes and inter-workings of imperial capitalist development, the state, mass society, and empire-building – in sum, as a site of modern global history in the making. Here, as in Yoshimi Yoshikazu’s path-breaking Grass-Roots Pacifism: The War Experience of the Japanese People (Kusa no na no fashizumu: Nihon minshû no senso taihen), the history of the war is told from the ‘social bottom up’ as well as from the ‘top down’, revealing Japanese from all walks of life not only as passive victims, but also as active participants in the war effort, thus treading a field of moral and political ambiguity previously off-limits on both right and left in Japan.

Whether focusing on the war experience itself, or on ways in which that history has been narrated in the past, many of the essays collected in this special issue reflect the contemporary trend of strategically focusing on history’s hidden grey areas’, ‘margins’, ‘intersections’ and ‘border crossings’. In their own ways, Owen Griffith’s consideration of prewar Japanese children’s literature, Yumiko Woyan’s essay on the actresses Li Guo Ren/Tamaguchi Yoshiko, Katarzyna Czerwińska’s discussion of the war’s legacy to Japanese eating habits, Remco Raben’s assessment of Japanese attempts to establish legitimacy in Rome, Christian Uhl’s considerations on the ‘Koto no ne no fashizumu: Nihon minshû no senso taihen’ and the transnational legacies, it is perhaps not surprising that the expanding field of postcolonial studies, pioneered and spearheaded by scholars of the South Asian subcontinent, has been at the cutting edge of many of these historiographical innovations.

These developments have had important implications for the study of modern Asian history, including the Asia-Pacific War period. One result has been the highlighting of interactive, transnational workings of social and cultural formation in Japan’s colonial encounters, moving beyond stark categories of oppression, resistance, and ‘collaboration’ to discover interests and processes that enabled people and institutions on both sides of the line dividing nation from nation and colonizer and colonized. In the case of the modern Japan specifically, growing scholarly skepticism regarding nation-centered narratives generally has been expressed in a growing identification of, and assault on, ‘Orientalist’, exceptionalist assumptions about modern Japan that were, as noted above, above the curve to the discipline through the entire postwar period.

Studies such as Louise Young’s path-breaking Japan’s Total Empire, for example, offered an exploration of Japan’s 1930s and 1940s colonization of mainland China, as not only not Japan’s ‘inherently exceptional, aggressive, underdeveloped qualities – rather as it was a modern variant of the social and cultural processes of modernity and modernization, the state, mass society, and empire-building – in sum, as a site of modern global history in the making. Here, as in Yoshimi Yoshikazu’s path-breaking Grass-Roots Pacifism: The War Experience of the Japanese People (Kusa no na no fashizumu: Nihon minshû no senso taihen), the history of the war is told from the ‘social bottom up’ as well as from the ‘top down’, revealing Japanese from all walks of life not only as passive victims, but also as active participants in the war effort, thus treading a field of moral and political ambiguity previously off-limits on both right and left in Japan.

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For further reading:
I\n the mainstream Korean narrative of the wartime period (1937-1945), or more accurately, 1937-1945, looking to a future when Japan would emerge triumphant in the titanic struggle against the valse whiteh

By the mid-1990s, this newfound freed-

dom in exposing the past sins of the fathers and the scholarship it engendered moved into a new phase. While the demo-
cratically elected regimes of Kim Dae-

jung (1992-2000) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-present) have continued to strug-
el with “the Dark Legacy” of the colonial period, South Korean scholars, now rel-
tively unencumbered by the desire to subordinate such reflections to the polit-
ical objectives of the colonial regime or its political successors, have begun a long and ardu-
ous process of parsing through the legacy of the colonial period, engaging in a long-overdue critical reflec-
tion on the possibility of post-colonial identity for Koreans.

In his more recent essays, however, Im has moved further into an even more critical direc-
tion on the varied features of Korean nationalism and has come to see significant prob-
lems and antinomies in the latter. He believes in the cause of the Second Sino-

The wartime period was characterized as a pitch-black vacuum (很有可能，的“歷史的轉變”）in which only certain elite members, the “pro-

Korean” traitors (明治維新派) were allowed to profit and flourish at the expense of the majority of Koreans. However, this characterization of the wartime period has also suppressed open, frank, unmediated investigation of the actual processes involved in the formation of the Japanese colonialism and its impact on the local society and culture. Studying the colonial-period “collaboration” between Japan and Korea, he argues, has been a nearly impossible task for many years, especially under the dicta-
torial regimes of Syngman Rhee (1946-

Among the issues that Koreans have at least certain problems and antinomies in the lat-

tering criticism of Korean nationalist ap-

nationalism and has come to see signif-

icant problems and antinomies in the lat-

eral period. Indeed, these problems – as colonizers and colonized, and having a history of collabora-

ted to the difficulties and prob-

Im Chi-hyon

nationalism as treason

Im Chi-hyon, a former student of East-

Nationalism as phantom

Yun Han-dong, a historian of modern Korea and one of the foremost proponents of the provocatively titled book The Colonial Gray Zone (2003), is even more skeptical than Im Chi-hyon on the possibility of rehabilitating Korean nationalism on an anti-colonial-nationalist (by his English usage), decoupled from its racist, chauvinistic and ethnocentric fea-
tures, dynamic and constantly forward-

colonialism and anti-colonial nationalism

mirror each other in a disturbingly complementary relationship

nationalism and modernity.

The process, however, turned out to be

mobilization.5 Those who fell outside the

tory period, South Korean scholars, now rel-

dominating force in the history of the world, and the actual circumstances involving Japan-

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I

Korea, inciting Korean youth to throw away their lives for the glory of the Japanese empire, or fictional works enveloped in a shroud of patriotic fervor and severe acceptance of the colonial order.6 The late 1990s saw a tremendous change in the discourse of power had already been its component, camouflaged under the discourse of liberation.” Here Im turns toward the significance of the ide-

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titled book The Colonial Gray Zone (2003), is even more skeptical than Im Chi-hyon on the possibility of rehabilitating Korean nationalism on an anti-colonial-nationalist (by his English usage), decoupled from its racist, chauvinistic and ethnocentric features, dynamic and constantly forward-

colonialism and anti-colonial nationalism – the teleological unfolding of which constitute the foun-
dational narratives of both North and South Korea as they stand today – mir-

colonial nationalism

While the democratic and welfare-oriented regimes of South Korea’s first Post-War liver more accurately 1937-1945, dated from

the position of victims. It was during this period, the late 1980s and early 1990s, following

democratization and rehabilitation of the Manchurian Military Academy.


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Between the national and the transnational: Li Xianglan/Yamaguchi Yoshiko and pan-Asianism

Yiman Wang

The lingering controversy over Li Xianglan for over half a century signals our unaccomplished task of coming to terms with her ambivalent historical legacy. My task here is to reassess the ramifications of her ‘theater of identity’ (Robinson 1994:471) and to emphasize the dialectical relationship between national affiliations and transnational mobility, both during and after the period of Japanese colonialism. In her most intriguing essay, Shelley Stephenson argues that Yamaguchi failed to continue her wartime success as Li Xianglan after 1945 because she became renounced as a Japanese—‘...Yamaguchi’s movement re-inscribes the boundaries between screen, off-screen, nation, and race, as firmly as these boundaries were once blurred in the elusive career of Li Xianglan’ (Stephenson 2002:12). Stephenson is correct to point out that the concept of nation was in flux during wartime. This, however, does not mean that concern with nation was lacking - both Japan and China in the 1930s and 40s vigorously championed nation-building projects, albeit with very different motivations and stakes. It is therefore crucial to politicize and historicize Li Xianglan’s pan-Asian mobility within the context of nation/empire-bucking. I argue that Li’s wartime success was premised upon her performative suturing into variant national, ethnic imaginaries, as much as it suggested her pan-Asian mobility, that is, the national and the transnational are mutually constitutive, not contradictory.

Wartime ‘Manchurian Orchid’
The rise of Li Xianglan as a star in the mid-late 1930s was directly linked to Japan’s colonial policy in Manchukuo, China, Taiwan and other East and Southeast Asian countries. The colonial cinema, the expansionist project of the ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’ between 1939 and 1945, coincided with Li’s pan-Asian stardom. Li became ‘a representative worthy of the name ‘Happy Asia’ (xing ya)’ (Stephenson 1999:24).

Li’s Manchurian-Japan films, or the ‘Chinese continental friendship films’ include The Song of White Orchid (dir. Kusakado Shokun) 1939), China Night (Osamu Fushimitzu 1940), Suzhou Night (Hermans Nomura 1941) and Winter Jasmine (Yasushi Kon) 1941. In these melodramatic narratives, Li routinely plays a young Chinese woman falling in love with a Japanese man (a doctor, clerk, or soldier). The new emotional allegiance strains her linguistic shift from Chinese to Japanese, in man (a doctor, clerk, or soldier). The new emotional allegiance played a young Chinese woman falling in love with a Japanese man (a doctor, clerk, or soldier). The new emotional allegiance strains her linguistic shift from Chinese to Japanese, in.

The Chinese audience’s reconstruction of Li as Manchurian/Chinese suggests their awareness of the importance of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relationship.

Yamaguchi Yoshiko playing a Japanese girl, the adopted daughter of a male Russian opera singer, singing ‘My Nightingale’ in Russian. The still is from the Yobu Man’ai production My Nightingale (directed by Shimizu Tanuyo, 1945).

Li’s chastevalued as a cultural traitor, a living embodiment of guilt and remorse. The postwar suppression of hanyuan launched by the Chiang Kai-shek-led Kuomintang (KMT) government aimed to isolate and cleanse the Other, to reclaim territorial control and reinforce the boundary between victorious China and defeated Japan. If Li Xianglan’s wartime pan-Asian appeal ostensibly erased national conflicts, her postwar repatriation and deconstruction brought ever-present national boundaries back to the foreground.

After more than three decades’ hiatus, the sign of ‘Li Xianglan’ re-entered the spotlight in the theater of the Sino-Japanese relationship. Her visit to China in 1978 allowed Chinese people to witness her deep-felt guilt for ‘deceiving’ them during the war, and to accept her profuse apologies. Once again ‘Li Xianglan’, the name and the body, had to bear the brunt of Japan’s militarist government committed in East and Southeast Asia, and to convey the sincere apology that ‘her’ government owed to its colonies. Only this time, her apology served to facilitate the establishment of Sino-Japanese diplomacy. The cultural ‘traitor’ thus became a cultural ‘diplomat’, yet another figure who traverses borders to better serve nation-oriented interests.

Encore Li Xianglan
Li’s political and entertainment value underwent further re-signification during the 1980s and 90s, when her wartime love songs were re-released as part of the nostalgic reconstruction of pre-1945 Republic Shanghai that swept post-socialist China and post-colonial Hong Kong alike. ‘Major two works rehearsed Li’s legendary life: the musical Li Xianglan and the four-episode TV show Sayonara Ri Ko-ro (民国, Li Xianglan), both appearing in the early 1990s and adapted from her autobiography. The Japanese musical was staged fifteen times in Beijing, Changchun, Shenyang, and Dalian in a Chinese audience of twenty thousand. The musical attributed Li’s repatriation not simply to her Japanese nationality, but to the Oriental virtue of repaying hatred with benevolence (Tiele baoxian), the same virtue said to underlie the restoration of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relationship.

Deviating from the political gloss, the China-Japan co-produced TV show Sayonara Ri Ko-ro ends in a most ironic moment: the Japanese ship is slowly pulling away from Shanghai with Li and other repatriated Japanese on board, when Li’s famous song ‘Yelai xiang’ (Night fragrance) is aired by the Shanghai People’s Radio Station. Swayed by her own voice, an emotional Li bids farewell to China and to ‘yoi Li Xianglan’. The title ‘Sayonara Ri Ko-ro’ thus shifts from the Chinese audience’s perspective (bidding farewell to one of its favorite wartime stars) to hers (bidding farewell to her now former self). The irreversible change from past glory to present guilt and humiliation, from Li Xianglan to Yamaguchi Yoshiko, however, is compromised by the persistence of her singing that supposedly belongs to the past. The return of her voice uncannily suggests her omnipresence in ordinary Chinese urbanites’ lives—so much so that the disavowal of her complicity is hardly sufficient to dispel her ‘cultural capital’. My analysis demonstrates that Li’s transnational mobility ultimately hinges upon the national divide. Given her built-in dual identity and the historical moment when she began her singing and acting career, Li served and continues to serve as a privileged embodiment of national politics as well as transnational fantasy. With trans-nationalism and globalization becoming our contemporary catchphrases, national politics that ultimately weighed down Li’s transnational mobility are, perhaps, escaping our radar. My goal, therefore, is to reassess the role national politics plays in both producing and containing trans-nationality—a dialectic Li has lived out her entire life.

Works cited


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On occupied China*

The Japanese occupation of China during World War II had a lasting legacy on the subsequent development of modern China and the Sino-Japanese relationship. Historians in the English-speaking world have recently begun to re-examine the history and meanings of Japanese-occupied China. Works such as John Boyle’s China and Japan at War, 1937-1945 (1972), Frederic Wakeman’s The Shanghai Bbedfellows: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime (1996), Parks Coble’s Chinese Capitalists in Japan’s New Order: The Occupied Lower Yangzi (2003) and Christian Henriot and Wen-hsin Yeh’s In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: Shanghai Under Japanese Occupation (2004) challenge the nationalist paradigm of moral dichotomy (resistance vs. collaboration, patriotism vs. betrayal) that has dominated the historiography. These works present us, in different ways, a complex world of political intrigue, urban terrorism, and ambiguous business strategies.

Surviving involved everyday negotiations with the occupying force which brought with it wartime economic conflicts and life-and-death consequences. In the occupied cities along the eastern seaboard, for example, Chinese were required to walk to the Japanese police station posted at every street corner. If they did not bow “properly” they would be slapped in the face, hit with a rifle butt, or forced to kneel for the day. To bow “properly” to the enemy was a symbol of absolute submission. Should Chinese have allowed themselves to be humiliated every time they walked to work or to the grocery store, or should they have refused to leave their houses to avoid humiliation? What should they have done if Japanese called them dogs and humiliated? What should they have done if Japanese called them dogs and humiliated? Should Chinese not bow “properly” they would be posted at every street corner. If they did not bow “properly”? These kinds of pressures constantly surrounded people in occupied China.

How much more do we need to learn in order to have a deeper, more nuanced and multi-faceted view of Japanese-occupied China? I want to suggest three areas for further research.

First, most of the research on occupied China has focused on the mainland. Understandable, as this is the case in manufacturing and financial industries, as many factories and banks (both state-run and private) moved parts of their operations to areas outside the mainland during the war, in part to spread investment risk. So we need to expand our research focus by situating the history of occupied China in the larger, more complex context of greater China.

Second, excepting recent work by Timothy Brook and Keith Schoppa, our research on occupied China has been decedently urban (and focusing specifically on Shanghai). This tendency is important as well as understandable as occupied China was made up of all the major cities that played significant roles in China’s harrowing negotiation with colonialism and modernity in the last century, and of these, many of these cities had been subjected to massacre, terrorism, and all kinds of atrocity by the Japanese army. Also, archival materials on the histories of these occupied cities are more easily available. However, we know that only part of occupied China was urban. An urban focus obscures the vast territories that were part of occupied China, and it is not until we begin to look at the rural areas that we can truly apprehend the multitude of experiences that individuals and families had during occupation. We need to expand into these important subjects in order to push our understanding of occupied China to another level of complexity.

Third, research on occupied China has tended to focus largely on men, public life, and elite culture. These are important subjects, but equally important are the subjects of women, domestic life, gender relationships, and popular cultures. New studies by, for example, Norman Smith, Susan Glosser and Allison Rottmann open new perspectives on the ways in which literary discourses in occupied China were shaped and redefined by women (e.g., Zhang Ailing and Su Qing), and on the changing functions and cultural meanings of cinema in the everyday life of Chinese living under occupation. But we still know little, for example, about any changes in the roles of women (e.g., the idea of ‘new woman’) and the ways in which domestic life was transformed in occupied cities, or in what ways the struggle of ordinary people, men and women, to create normality in the midst of Japanese terror changed the discourses and practices of urban popular cultures. We need to expand into these important subjects in order to push our understanding of occupied China to another level of complexity.

How did the Japanese organization of information and oppression in villages differ from the cities? In what ways did the experiences of occupation in rural China differ from urban experiences? These questions point to the need for more studies on the histories of the Japanese-ruled countryside and its multi-leveled connections with the cities.

Third, research on occupied China has tended to focus largely on men, public life, and elite culture. These are important subjects, but equally important are the subjects of women, domestic life, gender relationships, and popular cultures. New studies by, for example, Norman Smith, Susan Glosser and Allison Rottmann open new perspectives on the ways in which literary discourses in occupied China were shaped and redefined by women (e.g., Zhang Ailing and Su Qing), and on the changing functions and cultural meanings of cinema in the everyday life of Chinese living under occupation. But we still know little, for example, about any changes in the roles of women (e.g., the idea of ‘new woman’) and the ways in which domestic life was transformed in occupied cities, or in what ways the struggle of ordinary people, men and women, to create normality in the midst of Japanese terror changed the discourses and practices of urban popular cultures. We need to expand into these important subjects in order to push our understanding of occupied China to another level of complexity.

* My thanks to Mark Leff and Wen-hsin Yeh for their helpful comments.

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For the past sixty years international interrogation of Japanese war guilt has assumed the worst: Japan, taken as a moral monolith, is consistently found to be guilty of hubris, pettiness and political commitment to denounce past wrongs. While obfuscation and inconsistency have typified official government statements on the war (and individual conservative politicians have provoked outrage through their episodic revisionist statements), official statements do not represent the full range of feeling in Japan concerning WWII. This is even more marked when the topic becomes Japanese atrocities in that war, and how these atrocities should be remembered.

Beneath the hail of international accusation, the past sixty years have also featured the dogged persistence of a countervailing voice within Japan. Collectively known as ‘progressive thinkers’, individual voices have campaigned on the margins of political relevance since 1945. Their voices have barely been audible in the angry cacophony of postwar political rhetoric touched by atrocities, while the international anonymity of Japanese war responsibility discourse further suffuses from the lack of translation into more accessible languages. Borrowing the words of one significant progressive thinker and activist, Tsurumi Shunshuke, the marginalized, the acknowledged and memory have become the ‘voiceless voices’ of postwar Japan.

Marginal yet relevant

Seen from the standpoint of 2005, we could be forgiven for declaring that this strain of opinion in Japan has been ineffable. Yet, it would be facile to argue that marginality equals irrelevance. Operating on the political periphery has been both a historical necessity and a deliberate ethical choice on the part of progressives. As we can see from the fate of the Social Democratic Party of Japan (formerly the Japanese Socialist Party), occupying the pinnacle of political power can be fatal for progressive forces. Soon after Murayama’s prime ministership in 1994, his party almost fell off the political spectrum. And while Murayama provided subsequent Japanese governments with a linguistic framework for war apologies (repeated again in 2005), it came at a high price. To position their man within the governing coalition in that crucial war memory year of 1995, the Socialists effectively ditched every other progressive policy position they had held since 1955. They lost moral suasion as a result.

Marginality has thus been historically essential for those promoting discourse of Japanese war guilt. In 1945, ‘progressive’ meant being on the left, and in 1945, this carried moral force. A handful of communists had been the last to hold out against the wartime state, and the liberation of surviving communists from Japan’s jails in September 1945 ushered in an era where socialism and communism flowed seamlessly into the project of postwar democratization. While the Cold War descended on this liberal intellectual scene as early as 1947, leaving us with one of the great ironies of postwar Japanese discourse on WWII: U.S. occupation policies stratified and marginalised the very flag bearers of war responsibility debate. Similarly, the retention of the emperor in postwar political life (as a symbol of the unity of the nation) and his exclusion from indictment as a war criminal led to a selective narrative on Japanese war guilt.

Guilt allocation also omitted the majority of the Japanese population, with responsibility for the war pinned on military leaders and those in official wartime positions (the July 1945 Potsdam Declaration had declared the Japanese people deceived and misled by ‘willed militaristic advisors’) war guilt discourse was marginalized from the project of postwar democratization. While the U.S.-led occupation’s censorship, education and propaganda wings tried to correct this disassociation of democracy and war guilt, there is little doubt that war responsibility discourse was ethically distorted thereafter.

This ethical twist even flowed into the minds of postwar ‘progressives’. In the postwar period, Japan’s progressive thinkers positioned themselves against the conservative-led state and occupation as well as the war-time state. Fol.

For progressive thinkers, the normative association between constructing postwar democracy and defending individual subjectivity was crucial. Within the rubric of democracy and pacifism, thinkers such as Tsutsumi Shunshuke, Kuno Osamu and Shimizu Ikutaro (amongst many others) constructed the foundation of war responsibility discourse. In the process, they shaped the very contours of postwar politics.

Postwar Japanese politics, and war responsibility discourse, is in large measure a product of discord between disparate forces, not the monopoly of a conservative regime – the longevity of postwar conservative political leadership does not represent the dynamism and breadth of the struggle for politics and ethics, but the outcome of the struggle for power.

Collaboration and enlightenment

In January 1956, Tsurumi Shunshuke pro- voked a turn in the discourse on blame and guilt in his essay ‘The war responsibility of intellectuals’. Progressive intellectuals failed to identify the actual nature of collaboration and their own complicity. He argued that through their own efforts, neither compelled by force nor convinced by love of country, thinkers had deceived themselves of the power to dis- pel myths, thus facilitating deception by the state: ‘[intellectuals] actually decided to distort the functioning of their own minds while facing the forces that they knew in their minds to be wrong’. Intel- lectuals should now ‘confess that in the past they did not personally resist’, and by highlighting the great disparity between the objective promotion and facilitation of war and fascism, and the subjective awareness of having done so. Yet the ‘duty’ of progressive thinkers was to render visible and comprehensible ‘the mechanism that led the ruling class to perpetrate the war even though they were wailing all the while about how awful it all was’.2

In Tsutsumi and Murayama, we see in the dilemma that confronted postwar progressive thinkers on responsibility for the war and their personal failure to resist the wartime state and its ideology was stark and unflinch- ing, but it was inner-directed, almost quasi-meditate, from the postwar present. If there was any continuity between war and postwar, it was the implicit acknowl- edgement that intellectuals had an enlightenment mission within society. After 1956, war responsibility discourse became focused on postwar responsi- bility, on intellectual leadership of anti- state and pacifist movements.

Tsurumi stood at the forefront of a major study of war-time intellectual col- laboration, the three-volume Kyodo Hinken Tinto study, convinced that exposing the structure of war-era intel- lectual weakness would bolster pro-gressive thinkers in the postwar world. Tsutsumi’s approach infuriated other thinkers such as Yoshimoto Takaki, who would soon be echoed by progressive thinkers in the 1960s. The elitism implicit in the enlightenment motive seemed to Yoshimoto a transwar phenomenon, with intellectuals continuing their role as marginal political leadership of the people without realizing how alienated they were from them. Yoshimoto referred to postwar responsibility discourse on the war as ‘the flip-side of a counterfeit coin’, where both sides shared the flattened flaw of an experiential gap between theory and reality, between perception of reality and actual reality. He maintains that intellectuals facilitated the state’s deception of the nation during the war: ‘if we examine the history of revo- lutionary movements in Japan, we can say that the absolutist authorities utilized this dark zone that existed between the parallel layers of vanguard consciousness and popular consciousness, and absorbed it’.4 While progressive thinkers were focused on preserving society from the clutches of the postwar state, their critics were focused on what they saw as the yawning gap between thinkers and ordinary people.

Heroic periphery, ethical core

The legacy of postwar progressive movement is ever-present in contem- porary Japan. The tireless history text-

book campaigns (such as As 21) insist on detailing the facts of Japan’s war atrocities for high school textbooks, and continue to sustain citizen’s movements against textbook censorship. Japan’s courts are bursting with former victims demanding compensation, supported by citizen groups and teams of pro-bono Japanese lawyers. Committees of intellectuals form bilat-

Notes

1. The ‘voiceless voices’ (Koe Koe Koe no Koj) was a citizen’s movement that arose in 1960 during the protests against the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Tsutsumi Shunshuke was a key figure in this movement, and a major proponent of its activities.


Workers at war: class formation in wartime Chongqing

Joshua H. Howard

T he War of Resistance against Japan and the Anti-Japanese War were the stage for both civil war and socialist revolution in China. Since the revolution was primarily rural-based, historians have tended to overlook the stage for the Nationalist-controlled urban territories, most prominently Chongqing, China’s wartime capital between 1938 and 1945. Yet a handful of studies in English exists on the social and political history of Chongqing. With their focus on government elites and institutions, the studies neglect cinema, theatre, and literature for the Nationalist collapse-government factionalism, hyperinflation, military blunders, and malfeasance - have rendered invisible the role of urban social classes as agents of historical change.

In part, the marginalization of social class and the absence of a class analysis derive from the Nationalist government’s efforts to exclude class from its language to maintain social order and stifle political dissent. Mainland Chongqing officials censored any word that resonated with the labour movement. Even the word ‘labour’ became politically suspect. By 1940, General Yu Daowen, director and architect of the Nationalist arms industry, the largest wartime employer in Nationalist China, banned the metaphor of a working-class front dealing with production because, as he warned. “The word ‘labor’ is a term used to confuse the labor-capitalist class” (relational). In the late 1930s, film industry officials substituted a discourse based on patriotism and anti-imperialism. According to Guanziling labour leaders, Chongqing’s predominantly southern labour population precluded the formation of distinct social classes, and the country thus did not share the injustices associated with the ‘abnormalities’ of Western capitalism. Imperialism was the real culprit behind whatever oppression and suffering workers endured. And once the union formed between workers and their employers helped defeat the Japanese, the ‘labor problem’ would dissipate.

Ironically, Chinese historians have accepted at face value the wartime Nationalist official discourse, according to which the United Nationalist Government was a multi-party alliance committed to resisting Japanese imperialism - rendered issues of class subsidiary to patriotic goals. Labour historians have widely adopted the view that national sentiment subsumed class tensions during the Anti-Japanese War. In the most astutely of these, China’s wartime labour, the historian Qi Wu argues that the Anti-Japanese War. In the most astutely and sensitively formulated argument, the historian Qi Wu argues that the Anti-Japanese War was a “transformation” that “modified workers’ perceptions of class.” Throughout much of the 1940s, ‘down-river people’ played the dominant role in Sichuan society, anticipating the quasi-colonial relationship between mainland Chinese and Taiwanese during the late 1940s and 1950s, when mainlanders occupied elite positions in Taiwan’s economy and political system. Repression in the form of severe military discipline, the intensity of the Nationalist political program (workers in the defence industry were subject to factory cell meetings), and its total separation from life struggles further alienated workers from Nationalist ideologues. While the Guanziling lost support among workers, both underground Communist Party members and non-Communist working-class activists consciously pur- chased and shaped workers’ class conscious. Communists moved from mobilizing workers in masse during the National Salvation Movement, a patriotic movement that swept urban China during the mid to late 1940s, to developing a clandestine force. By the early 1940s, underground networks, reading workers’ consciousness, became crucial links between workers and the CCP. The Communist Daily, Xinhua Ribao, in particular, served as an important forum in which to criticize social relations within the factory and to question the legitimacy of the Nationalist government. Workers’ grievances and demands, especially over wages, dailies - a term implying higher pay and social status - stemmed from their own work experiences and the prevalent social stigma associated with manual labour. As a former labourer in the telecommunications bureau recalled, ‘I was ridiculed, and this hurt me both physically and psychologically. I often wondered, was I not a person? I also wanted to enjoy people’s rights. Why did I have to do canteen labour like a beast of burden and be yelled at to work?’

Arguably, only a militant minority, those who envisioned a radical restructuring of society, promoted the Communist press in wartime Chongqing. But the popularity of Xinhua Ribao among workers indicates that their ideas did resonate with many workers’ sense of injustice and desire for equal treatment. By the mid 1940s, the impulse toward a class movement and class organization among Chongqing workers underlay this process. Through the dynamic of the labour movement, workers’ views of the world increasingly made their class point of reference. This was most evident in the concentrated, violent, and often coordinated struggles of workers in the aftermath of the Anti-Japanese War. It was also apparent in workers’ increasing demands for unionization and the leftist push of corporatist labour organizations, most notably the Chinese Association of Labour.

At the very least, bringing class back in may cause us to rethink our view of polit- ics in wartime Chongqing, and by extension Nationalist China. From the very first press reports issued from the hilly city, journalists described the Nationalist regime’s insinuate decline as a result of its own endemic sicknesses, re- corruption, bungled fiscal policies, and factionalism. Conversely, while his- torians on the right have question the legitimacy of the Nationalist regime, they have unwitt- ingly minimized the CCP’s popular appeal in urban China prior to 1949. To be sure, Chongqing was not ‘Red Chongqing,’ but its political colours were undoubtedly more vivid than its infamous grey fog. □

Notes
4. Howard, Workers at War, 154. 5. ibid., 160.
6. Joshua Howard

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War, as historian Gabriel Kolbo notes, has had profound social and revolutionary effects. ‘More than any other single factor, the overwhelming and directed consequences of war have shaped the human and political experiences of our century and have become the motor of change within it, creating political and ideological upheavals - revolts being the most important of them - that otherwise had scant possibility of occurring.'
Neither victors nor victims: transplanted/suppressed memories of the Sino-Japanese War in postwar Taiwan

Taiwan was a Japanese colony between 1895 and 1945. During the 1937-1945 Sino-Japanese War, the people of Taiwan, as subjects of the Japanese Empire, fought alongside the Japanese against China. After the war, Taiwan was turned over to its wartime enemy, the Chinese Nationalist (KMT) government. Overnight, wartime enemies became postwar compatriots and fellow citizens.

How did the Taiwanese, transformed from Japanese colonial subjects to Chinese citizens, remember the war after 1945?

I

The study of historiography, it is well-argued that a common flaw of history writing is anachronism - writing history based on the present day view instead of what actually happened in the past. If anachronism represents a temporal issue in historiography, the transplantaion and suppression of wartime memories in postwar Taiwan points to a neglected spatial dimension in history writing.

Transplanted memories

Under KMT rule between 1945 and 2000, the people of Taiwan were taught a war history transplanted from mainland China while having their own and their ancestors’ war histories suppressed from public memory. Immediately after the war, Taiwanese who had worked with the Japanese were indiscriminately accused of collaboration and/or prosecuted as Hanjian or Chinese traitors.

Even leading anti-Japanese figures such as Lin Xiangtang were once considered by the KMT government as Hanjian (Qiu 1942: 377). The KMT view of Taiwan’s wartime experience not only conflated voluntary and forced cooperation with the Japanese, more significantly, it projected the postwar condition of Taiwanese being Chinese nationals backwards into wartime and asserted, anachronistically, that Taiwanese were Chinese nationals during the war.

This transplanation of a mainland Chinese view of recent history was intensified as the KMT government retrofitted and consolidated itself on Taiwan in 1945. To mold patriotic Chinese out of former colonial subjects, KMT government policy propagated as orthodoxy its own view of the war. In history textbooks and official accounts, the war only consisted of events that did not take place in Taiwan - the 9/18 or September 18 Incident (jiuqi shuban) in Shenyang (Mukden) of 1931, the 778 or July 7 Incident (qihao shuban) at Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident of 1937, and others.

As a war that was only known as the “Eight-year War of Resistance” (against the Japanese) (qihan kanggan). Memo- ory of the war based on these events did not take into account what happened in Taiwan and to Taiwanese, and subsequently contributed to a view of the war that was entirely China-centered. As a result, postwar Taiwanese absorbed the transplanted perspective of the victors, which was the opposite of the true wartime experiences of Taiwanese.

Suppressed memories

As the KMT government transplanted the mainland Chinese view of the war to postwar Taiwan, it suppressed memory of what did happen in Taiwan. Before 1945, China was at war with Japan, as subjects of Japan, the people of Taiwan were at war with the people of China. However, memory of this experience was largely suppressed.

For example, the history of more than 200,000 Taiwanese-nationale Japanese soldiers and military personnel (shuhui) lost their lives in what the Chinese termed “minzu kangzhan” (people against people); the 7/7 Incident (qihao shuban) or Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident of 1937, and others.

The war as a whole was known as the “Eight-year War of Resistance” (against the Japanese) (qihan kanggan). Memory of the war based on these events did not take into account what happened in Taiwan and to Taiwanese, and subsequently contributed to a view of the war that was entirely China-centered. As a result, postwar Taiwanese absorbed the transplanted perspective of the victors, which was the opposite of the true wartime experiences of Taiwanese.

China’s takeover of Taiwan was depicted as a glorious recovery, discounting the sense of loss, fear and uncertainty that many Taiwanese felt when they learned of Japan’s defeat.

Whose memories?

This transplacement of memory from mainland China and the suppression of memory from within Taiwan complemented and reinforced one another to construct a false memory of the war. For example, the people of Taiwan were represented as patriotic Chinese fighting the Japanese, most bluntly in government-sponsored publications or movies such as Victory (or Meiyou, plum blossom, 1976) in the 1970s. Contradicting historical facts, all respectable Taiwanese in Victory spoke Mandarin and fought China’s “war of resistance” - against Japanese rule in Taiwan, and against Japanese military invasion in China.

Similar processes of transplantation/ suppression of historical memory and construction of false memory informed representations of Taiwan’s wartime international relations. As a part of the Japanese war machine, Taiwanese were mobilized to support and consequently suffered dearly from Japan’s war against the Allies. Toward the end of the war, Taiwan was heavily bombarded by the Allies. The view of Taiwan as a battlefront in wartime history was rarely found in postwar accounts as it contradicted the transplanted KMT government’s view where the Allies were the savors of Tai- wan and friends of China. As a result, these episodes, too, were suppressed from public memory. Instead, what was emphasized in postwar accounts of Tai- wan’s wartime international relations was the benevolence of the Allies. Most notably, the 1943 meeting between Roos- evelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo and the resulting joint state- ment (Korean Declaration, in postwar account) was featured and highly celebrated.

The most notable example of false mem- ory was the account of China’s commit- ment to recover Taiwan. Between 1935 and 1944, Chinese authorities never chal- lenged the status of Taiwan as prescribed in the Treaty of Shimonsokei. It was not until 1 November 1942 that the then Chi- nese Foreign Minister Song Ziwon (TV. Song) stated China should “retrieve recovery” continues to prevail in Taiwan today.

As a result of the aforementioned historical amnesia, historical exploitation and sup- pression of historical memory, Tai- wanese largely forgot their wartime history of fighting and suffering as part of the Japanese wartime empire. What the Taiwanese remembered about the war was, instead, mainland China’s wartime history. But while remember- ing the transplanted Other’s war histo- ry of glory and triumph, Taiwanese were continuously reminded that they did not win the war. It was often asserted in his- tory textbooks and official accounts that it was the Chinese, contrary to the Tai- wanese who sided with Japan, who fought the ‘national war of resistance’ (qihan kanggan). As a result, the Tai- wanese hardly recognized themselves, or were recognized by others, as victors of the war. At the same time, since Tai- wan’s own wartime history of fighting and suffering was largely suppressed in public memory, Taiwanese hardly rec- ognized themselves, or were recognized by others, as victims of the war.

Taiwanese postwar memories of being neither victors nor victims challenge the conventional epistemological paradigm that categorically identifies victors and victims in wartime history. Further- more, the transplantation and suppres- sion of Taiwanese wartime memories, as discussed in this paper, point to a spa- tial dimension in history writing that deserves more scholarly attention.

References


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Memorializing the Tokyo air raids

Tokyo occupies a peculiar place in Japan’s landscape of war memory. As capital city and host to Yasukuni Shrine and other national sites of memory, it figures prominently. Yet as a city lived and experienced by its residents, it seems a place where history holds little sway. Where are the memorials and museums that remember the dead and try to make sense of the 100,000 civilians who perished in the air raid of 10 March 1945, which initiated the US government’s embrace of urban terror bombing as a legitimate form of warfare? Where are the places through which Tokyoites have attempted to understand and convey the violence that the Japanese government allowed to be inflicted upon the city’s inhabitants in the closing months of the war?

Cary Karacas

Unlike many places in Japan—most notably Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Okinawa—Tokyo does not erected a prominent memorial space to serve as a vital if imperfect reminder of the tragedies inflicted by the war. Indeed, markers of Tokyo being laid waste by incendiary bombs in 1945 are so peripheral that most Tokyoites would be hard pressed to locate them. There is, however, a public air raid memorial in a small park just north of the popular Edo-Tokyo Museum. Constructed by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and dedicated in 2001, the semi-circular, flower-covered granite monument, according to its dedication plaque, is meant to mourn and remember the over 100,000 civilians killed in the air raids, as well as promote the pursuit of peace by acting as a permanent reminder of the tragedy that occurred. Examining how this particular structure came into being gives us a sense of the determinants that have contributed to how the Tokyo air raids have and haven’t been publicly remembered.

Let’s begin with where the memorial is located, in Sumida ward’s Yokoami Park. On 1 September 1943, after a major earthquake struck the metropolis, tens of thousands of people from a working class quarter of the city took refuge from the spreading fires by fleeing to the two hectare park, only to lose their lives as a firestorm swept upon them. Tokyoites came to identify the park with this catastrophe and turned it into a sacred space of sorts: the city government and citizens erected Earthquake Memorial Hall and a charred house to hold the victims’ remains, as well as a museum and numerous memorials to remember the disaster and its human toll. Just fifteen years after the celebration of the capital’s reconstruction and Yokoami Park’s inauguration in 1950, catastrophe re-visited the city, as incendiary bombs made refuges of millions and reduced half the metropolis to a wasteland filled with charred corpses.

The metropolitan government quickly buried most of the air raid victims in mass graves located in parks, temple precincts, and on private land, where they remained for several years. Dissention between interest groups on where victims’ remains should permanently be stored caused the Occupation’s General Headquarters to order the metropolitan government to use the charred house in Yokoami Park. The government did so, putting the cremated remains of 105,000 air raid victims next to the ashes of the 58,000 victims of the 1923 disaster. Since 1950, the city has sponsored Buddhist memorial services for both groups every 1 September and 10 March.

The project was significant in allowing survivors to recover memories of the horrific events, and stimulated others throughout the country to write histories of their own cities’ destruction. In 1953, a nationwide Society for Recording Air Raids decided to build resource centres throughout Japan as a way of transmitting the experience to future generations. While some cities made progress toward realizing this goal, Tokyo’s fiscal crisis prevented governor Minobe from building what came to be called the Tokyo Peace Museum.

The election of Suzuki Shun’ichi as governor in 1979 further complicated the task. Suzuki’s conservative leanings and his global city vision for Tokyo did not match the evolving approach of those who continued to lobby for the Tokyo Peace Museum. The Society to Build Peace Museums, in part an outgrowth of the Society for Recording Air Raids, took the position that any museum meant to transmit the experience of air raids on Japan’s cities had to be situated within a broader narrative about the war’s causes and effects, and that discussion of Japan’s aggression in Asia and its war responsibility must play a key role in any museum meant to promote peace consciousness.

Governor Suzuki chafed at this approach and refused to build the structure. When a coalition led by the Socialist Party assumed control of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly in the early 1990s, it feared the governor, now in his fourth and final term, to issue a directive to proceed with the Tokyo Peace Museum. In 1993, a committee returned the design for a 5,000 square meter structure, secured a site for it near the mouth of the Sumida River, and came up with a guiding philosophy for ‘Tokyo’s twenty-first century symbol of peace’. The election of Suzuki Shun’ichi as governor in 1979 further complicated the task. Suzuki’s conservative leanings and his global city vision for Tokyo did not match the evolving approach of those who continued to lobby for the Tokyo Peace Museum. The Society to Build Peace Museums, in part an outgrowth of the Society for Recording Air Raids, took the position that any museum meant to transmit the experience of air raids on Japan’s cities had to be situated within a broader narrative about the war’s causes and effects, and that discussion of Japan’s aggression in Asia and its war responsibility must play a key role in any museum meant to promote peace consciousness.

Memorializing the Tokyo air raids

In an important shift in 1979, Tokyo governor Minobe Ryōchiku—a self-described ‘flexible utopian socialist’—offered to fund the newly formed Society for Recording the Tokyo Air Raids to publish a multi-volume account of the raids. The museum in Yokoami Park continued, another form of opposition arose, this time against the contents of the proposed exhibit. Leading the charge was neo-nationalist Fujisaki Nobukatsu, founder of the Advancement of a Liberal View of History Study Group, whose purpose was to combat the ‘masochistic historical perspective’ of ‘school textbooks that included mention of Japanese atrocities committed in Asia. Fujisaki also took a strong position against the conciliatory messages of Japan’s peace museums. To prevent the Tokyo Peace Museum from being built, he formed the oddly-named Citizens Concerned about Peace in Tokyo, organized protests in Yokoami Park, and wrote many opinion pieces attacking the exhibit proposals.

Exhibits that mentioned such things as Japanese air raids in China, Fujisaki argued, would lead visitors to conclude that the Tokyo air raids directly resulted from Japan’s activities in Asia, and would accordingly ‘trample on the hearts of children and exert mind control over them’. Tokyo. Fujisaki insisted, should build a memorial to the air raid victims without delay; the museum could wait until a consensus had been reached on what ought to be included in the exhibits.

In 1999, Fujisaki’s protests and his alliance with a local politician resulted in a Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly decision to prohibit the construction of the museum and to have the monument built in Yokoami Park. Despite the original plan, the monument was not to mention ‘worldwide victims of the war’, but refer only to the air raid victims, mourning, and peace.

In March 2001, Governor Ishihara Shintarō presided over the dedication of the ‘Dwelling of Remembrance’ monument, which eerily resembles the air raid shelters that dotted Tokyo during the war. Some bereaved relatives were consolidated that, after more than half a century, Tokyo had publicly remembered those who died in the fire bombings. Other air raid survivors were less impressed, charging that it can never achieve the goals assigned it. The monument, they argued, because it was built in Yokoami Park and without the peace museum, can never adequately pay tribute to the dead or promote the pursuit of peace. Given the ongoing controversies over the appropriate place to situate the Tokyo air raids, both in the city’s landscape and that of Japan’s war memory, we may recall a line from Robert Lowell’s poem ‘For the Union Dead’:

Their monument sticks like a fishbone in the city’s throat.

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The Dwelling of Remembrance’ monument dedicated to victims of the Tokyo air raids

Remains of woman and infant after the March 1945 Tokyo air raid
E ver since the occupation ended in 1952, an ostensibly vigilant and pro-gressively education ministry (Monbushō) has regularly carried out a comparable ‘whitening over’ exercise (a mixture of political whitewash and scientific whitewash) on the textbooks of the day. For instance, having conceded in 1957 the existence of the sansū (comfort woman) system of forced prostitution run by the imperial army in China and the Pacific theatre of war from 1937-45, the latest history textbooks approved in April this year have been obliged to erase the whole topic once again. This imme-diately created yet another crisis for Japan in relations with Korea and China, whose women were among the principal victims of the system. And for the first time, too, some of these textbooks also endorse the official Japanese claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, an increasingly sensitive issue. For China, this is hotly disputed by Beijing.

Whitening over

Contemporary whitening over is not done by children with brush and ink, but of course, by censorship panels at Monbu-shō. In relentless pressure from the reigning bureaucrats at the ministry and the ascendant politicians of Jōinin, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). So one has to suspect that the whitening out of the comfort women may be followed by similar treatment of the forced labour system which saw thousands of abducted Koreans and Chi-nese slaves in the mines and factories of wartime Japan. Even the most famous wartime atrocities, such as the Nanking massacre of 1937 and the ghast-ly human experiments and chemical and bacterial attacks orchestrated by Unit 731 in Manchuria, may be slated for this treatment.

Already the deficiencies of Japan’s e-du-cational system seem to have had a determinable and deadly impact on the attitudes of Japanese youth: ‘In a 1983 NHK [the national broadcaster] poll of 3,623 people, 10 per cent of those aged 16 to 19, and 11 per cent of those in their 20s, replied that they ‘can’t tell’ whether Japan waged a war of aggression [in China and the Pacific]. Those ratios rose to 20 per cent and 37 per cent, respect-ively, in a 2000 poll.’ 1

Japanese widely regard themselves as among the principal victims in World War Two - not so much, unfortunately, as victims of their own government, but as victims of discriminatory American poli-cies in the lead-up to war, and of blockade, indiscriminate firebombing and nuclear holocaust towards war’s end. These policies and laws were established long before the US has passed up the chance to set Japan a good example. Apparently superpowers need never say sorry, even to close allies, for inflicting needlessly- death, suffering and destruction.

Peter King

In the post-surrender but pre-occupation Japan of August 1945, Japan’s still military-dominated and emperor-led government decreed a new history teaching policy for schools. It became known as suminuru: the ‘blackening over’ of ‘passages deemed to be militaristic, nationalistic, or in some manner undemocratic’ in schoolbooks concerned with modern Japan. The blackening was done by the students themselves with brush and ink, in class - and often several coats of sumi (ink) were required.2

There is now two competing visions of ‘Japan’s past. They are both mutually exclusive, and the politics of apology have been largely vitiated by euphemism, half-heartedness, insincerity and conspicu-ous lack of follow-up.

At the heart of this failure is the preced-ing American failure to set Japan, as it did Germany, to the real work of victory in 1945. This was above all the result of General MacArthur’s decision to pre-serve the emperor system and ruthless-ly human experiments and chemical and bacterial attacks orchestrated by Unit 731 in Manchuria, may be slated for this treatment.

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The memory wars: Japan, China and Asia’s future

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A slow remembering: China’s memory of the war against Japan

Sparked by accusations that the Japanese Ministry of Education had authorized textbooks that whitewash atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers during the war, China’s public was allowed to vent its rage in April 2005. The Japanese consulate in Shanghai was attacked with stones and bottles, while the authorities warned foreigners of all nationalities to stay away from the demonstrations. Sixty years after the end of the Sino-Japanese war, the history of that period is becoming more, not less prominent in the contemporary politics of both societies.

Rena Mitter

The disappearing war

In one sense, China’s new awareness of its anti-Japanese conflict is part of a process by which its attitude toward its own history is becoming more normal. For all other major powers involved in the Second World War, victorious or defeated, engagement with their war experience was a crucial part of creating postwar identity, whether it was Britain coming to terms with the loss of its empire, France and Germany seeking a new type of European union, or Japan turning from strong-armed empire to demilitarized economic powerhouse. Of all the major powers, only China failed as a society to engage with the meaning of its anti-Japanese conflict. This was in large part due to the way China moved from world war to Cold War. The Nationalists and Communists were at war by 1946, while the eventual victory of the Communists in 1949 meant that a balanced consideration of the earlier war was impossible, even though it had ended less than four years previously.

Through most of the Cold War, the aspects of the War of Resistance to Japan, published since 1991 by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and among the sources of that legitimacy was the restoration of official interest in the war against Japan. Officially-endorsements of the new historiography appeared in many media: films, books, and perhaps most concretely (in all senses of the term), three massive museums in Nanjing, Beijing, and Shenyang, respectively on the sites of the Nanjing Massacre, the Marco Polo Bridge incident that marked the outbreak of all-out war, and the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. There was also a marked growth in scholarly interest in the period, the most notable example being the journal KangRi zhanzheng (Research on the War of Resistance to Japan), published since 1991 by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which deals with topics on the period that could only have been dreamed of a decade or two earlier.

Public responses

The war also provides some of the most worrying phenomena which stem from the new space for discussion and argument in Chinese society. One of the most contentious discussions in the field of contemporary Chinese politics is the extent to which the media, demonstra-
Militarization of nutrition in wartime Japan

Food assumes strategic significance in wartime, due to its basic role in strengthening the troops and enabling the productivity of workers, but also in its potential effect on population growth. Measures implemented in wartime Japan to maximize the efficient use of food resources aimed at both, but their consequences went far beyond their intended goals.

Alongside the industrialization of production and the commercialization of consumption of food, many societies over the past hundred years have seen increased government intervention in their diets. The dissemination of nutritional science through new publications and popularizing nutritional education became particularly strong in the first half of the twentieth century, but thorough reforms began in wartime Japan. Knowledge of how to make maximum use of limited resources was seen as essential for national security, and therefore the authorities propagated science-based practical advice on nutrition. Like other projects undertaken after 1937 for the sake of improving the health and welfare of the populace, military intervention was responsible for placing nutrition high on the agenda of policy makers.

Efforts to improve the army diet could be observed since the turn of the twentieth century, but thorough reforms began after World War I. The objective behind these reforms was to maintain soldiers’ bodies and morale in the best possible condition at minimum cost. In other words, food served to the troops needed to be nourishing, tasty and cheap. Innovations to achieve this goal involved a wide-ranging educational program for army cooks, as well as the introduction of modern cooking equipment to economize on human labour (meat grinders, vegetable cutters, dish washers) and ingredients with long shelf life (dehydrated vegetables, preserved fish stock, tinned food). In 1929, further reforms were implemented at the organizational level – the assignment of kitchen personnel was changed from a shifting basis to a permanent system, and the delivery of provisions was reorganized to include all ingredients. Thus far, only staple foods (rice, barley) were delivered by the depot while remaining provisions were purchased locally by each unit (Yasuhara and Imai 2002:9).

The major activities of Ryūkōi were publishing of the monthly magazine Ryūjiki (Provisions Friends), which included practical advice on civilian mass catering and accounts of various activities coordinated by Ryūkōi, such as educational courses for caterers at hospitals, schools and factories. After more than a decade’s experience in training its personnel (in 1939, Ryūkōi opened the School of Provisions (Shokuryū kai)), which provided practical education in nutrition and cooking for approximately 500 civilians yearly. Graduates of the school were offered employment in institutions related to mass catering, such as institutions of rationing and public nutrition, as well as Ryūjiki’s own infrastructure throughout the empire.

At first, activities coordinated by Ryūkōi aimed at persuading the general public to embrace the military model of efficient nourishment represented by hearty stews and curries and industrially processed provisions. However, as provisions for the troops was considered the priority, the home front had to make do with what was left. For example, between 1940/41 and 1944/45, the amount of rice supplied to the armed forces rose from 160 to 744 thousand tons, making it impossible to retain rationing standards for civilians (Johnston 1951:172). Yet, the government’s confidence in a scientific solution for food shortages remained strong until its very end. Special campaigns advocating methods to economize on rice through careful chewing, and mixing it with vegetables and other grains were launched. Through posters and pamphlets, Consumption of more efficient staples that contained more calories and were cheaper to produce, such as sweet potatoes and squash, were propagated as well. As the moment of capitulation approached, public campaigns shifted to instructions on maintaining vegetable gardens and brewing soy sauce out of fish bones.

Food shortages remained a major problem in Japan after 1945 despite US food relief programmes. On the top of millions of hungry Japanese in the homeland, over six million military men and civilians who were by 1945 repatriated from the colonies and occupied territories had to be fed. This situation led to several hundred victims of starvation and widespread malnutrition during the second half of the 1940s (Dower 1999:54, 89-97).

However, long-term consequences of the food shortage on the Japanese diet went beyond hunger and deprivation. The wartime experience wrapped up the construction of the Japanese national diet – a process that replaced the diversified, class and community-tied prac- tices of the pre-modern era with homogen- izations in cuisine.


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The nation’s interrupted path: the Pacific War in Philippines history textbooks

For Filipinos, the Pacific War is the Japanese Occupation. Bayonet-bearing Japanese soldiers, traitorous local spies, heroic Filipino guerrillas, victory ‘joes’ (Americans), and the triumphant return of General McArthur are the dominant historical memories associated with this horrific war. Popularized by the mass media, these images in part originate from history textbooks, and are primary sources of people’s war-time imagination.

Partia L. Reyes

H ere we examine three better-known works: Constantino and Constan- tinos (1978) and The Pagant of Philip- pinie (1960). While these two have been required readings for fourth year high school and first year college stu- dents for decades, and have simplified the realities of war-time Philip- pinos by depicting Filipinos as either war heroes or victims. In either conception, Filipinos are denied an independent agency in their own history.

Despite years of scholarly criticism and ridicule, textbooks remain vital for both teachers and students in the education of people environments. The Philippines is no dif- ferent, where texts play critical roles in constructing what Anderson famously calls an ‘imagined’ nationality (Anderson 1990). Indeed we could link the nation’s historical consciousness with the production and reception of historical texts (Rustow 1960: 159). This essay concentrates on the former, con- textualizing the creation of historical knowledge and the messages and mean- ings it strives to convey.

An intrusion

Agoncillo, the Constantinos and Zaide contributed to the entrenchment of pos- itivism in historical scholarship in the Philippines. They relied heavily on written sources to shape their arguments and conclusions, including memoirs of American soldiers, a handful of accounts of select Filipino leaders, Eng- lish-language compilations of docu- mentary texts (Rustow 1960: 159). This essay concentrates on the former, con- textualizing the creation of historical knowledge and the messages and mean- ings it strives to convey.

The Philippines

Agoncillo’s writing moved succeeding historians, not least the husband and wife team of Letizia and Renato Con- stantino. Opting for a political economy perspective on the occupation, the Con- stantino saw economics as the driving force behind Japan’s conquest of the Pacific. Like Zaide and Agoncillo, they concentrated on the occupation as an expe- rience that shattered the comfort of the Filipinos’ tranquil colonial world, disrup- ting the path to American-er- gogneering. For four decades of American colonial rule had conditioned Filipinos to be loyal to their American masters; as the Constantinos pointed out, Filipinos even forgave McArthur in December 26, 1941 for declaring Mani- la an ‘open city’, which in effect handed the nation’s capital to the Japanese. Filip- inos were forced to serve Japanese forces for their American colonial masters, even as these colonizers abandoned the Philippines during the war.

The dark years

These texts use darkness as the primary metaphor to describe the situation Fil- ipinos found themselves in. From December 1941 to February 1945, Zaide lays bare the brutality of Japanese rule: thousands who refused to cooperate were tortured and killed. Meanwhile, the regime coerced Filipino leaders to col- laborate in a puppet government that brainwashed Filipinos with Japanese wartime propaganda. Unlike scholars and politicians who depict this elite as traitorous leeches duplicitous with Japan, Zaide paints them as faithful servants carrying out the wishes of the Commonwealth President in- exile, Manuel Quezon, who urged offi- cials to follow the “good/evil binary.”

Filipino men detested the frequent slapping by Japanese soldiers. For Filipinos, only women could (be) slap(ped); they would rather be hit than slapped by another man.

In Agoncillo’s eyes, Japanese rule meant heroic resistance of ordinary Filipinos, whose guerrilla units incapacitated Japan- ese war efforts. For example, reports on the lowpoints where guerrillas collected and submitted to McArthur’s headquarters in Australia greatly assisted his return- ing forces. However, in 1944, all Agoncillo sought to emphasize the ways in which Fil- pinos struggled to purge the Japanese from the homeland. Lost in Agoncillo’s population, the issues of questions of rivalry, competition, and deceit amongst guerilla fighters that burst onto the scene after the war. McArthur broke no ambiguity and con- tradiction for his valiant guerrillas.

It was left to the Constantinos to cast light on these issues of parroting narrative, although in this case perhaps overly so. The Constantinos indubitably stamped the underground fighters collaborators, those who preferred American colonial masters over the Japanese, and who- with McArthur’s help - sought political or economic gain upon their favored col- onizers’ return by exploiting the issue of colonial liberation. The post-war govern- ment of unwanted (read: left-leaning) leaders. All told, for the Constantinos, Filip- inos let the opportunity provided by the war to achieve independence slip through their fingers. Instead, they bashed in the glow of post-war American influence, leaving the independence granted in 1946 a hollow shell.

Project nation

Characteristically, these texts figured the Pacific War as a stepping stone on the path towards shaping the archipelago into an ideal nation. Herding historian Ronan’s philosophy of telling histo- ries in a predetermined, structured way (through a mechanical approach to narrating the war, featuring names, dates and places, and thus clumsily seeking to relate the inde- fatigability of the Filipino spirit. In its wake, regular folks were either swept aside or characterized with platitudes. And instead of inviting readers to recog- nize and understand a painful past of their own, Zaide enjoined them to con- centrate on the larger project of (their leaders in) building a nation, thereby act- ing as if the war was a temporary event for its pathway to order and modernity.

Agoncillo’s text took no part in this national charade. Having experienced the war as a boy, he well understood the daily lives of those toughing out the occupation, and thus strove to bring forth the nuances of local culture in a war-time context. For example, he relat- ed how Filipino men detested the frequent slapping by Japanese soldiers. For Filipinos, only women could (be) slap(ped); they would rather be hit than slapped by another man. Although such stories gave colour to an otherwise ter- rifying account of the Pacific War, it also led to simplifications. Agoncillo charac- terized Filipinos as consumed by either unreasonable volatility or treachery, thereby stripping them of human depth and complexity. To be sure, Filipinos were afforded historical agency in Agoncillo’s account, but one trapped in the good/evil binary.

A similar duality confounds the Con- stantino’s work. Polically, they fea- tured American, Japanese and American elites as the occupation’s true adver- saries. Meanwhile, poor Filipinos were depicted as either fighters or victims, anonymous ‘masses’ that supposedly struggle to be. For the Constantinos, these struggles constituted the driving forces of the occupation, and thus from which empowered masses would emerge to claim and build a nation in their terms. What the Constantinos hoped for the country’s revolution: a Russia or China; the Philippine scenario was interpreted not on its own terms, but forced into an ideal, linear progression towards multilateralism/righteousness, which long ago had been achieved in Europe.

In such a context, Filipinos fit awkward- ly at best. Left largely under-explored, the Filipino experience is tailored to rein- force the centrality and universality of European thought and history.

For the Constantinos, and international perception of the Pacific War interrupted an American imperial proj- ect to transform the Philippines into a self-governing polity. Deserted by their colonizers, Filipinos succumbed to a dark Japanese rule characterized by arbi- trary arrests, torture and killings from 1941 to 1945, only to be ‘liberated’ by the bravery of McArthur’s American forces with assistance by Filipino guerrillas. For Agoncillo, the Constantinos and Zaide regarded the war as a military exercise, a venue for social disengagement, a missed opportunity towards an ideal polity - all told, another trying episode in the coun- try’s march towards nationhood.

Amples space for re-interprets exists. The heavy use of American or English- language sources has left Filipino secondary literature often sparsely set up, the number of memoirs of Filipino soldiers, which start- ed coming out in the 1990s with other military accounts, would be illuminating, we would have a better understanding of forced prostitution to shed light on the state of women during the war. Now mostly declassified, American documents might provide clues about Filipino chil- dren, Chinese, Muslims, indigenous communities and others whose histori- cal agencies have been left wanting. Oral history, through interviewers surviving and their descendents, would go a long way in accounting for these ‘missing’ Fil- pinos. Their incorporation would pro- vide a more nuanced and less paternalistic of people’s personhood under desperate conditions, bringing life to a people’s history of the war in their own terms.

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Catastrophe on Peleliu: Islanders’ memories of the Pacific War

The American invasion of Peleliu in September 1944 was one of the bloodiest and hardest-fought battles of the Pacific War. The 11,000 Japanese defenders dug over 500 caves into the island’s mountains and forced U.S. forces to spend 73 days blasting them out. In the end, only 300 Japanese survived and the island lay shattered and burned. The 850 native inhabitants had been evacuated before the fighting, but were devastated to find upon their return that their homeland had been churned into a wasteland.

Japenese and American perspectives on the battle contrast markedly with those brought to their memories of war and consider the island today by tourists from the two former belligerents. Many of those who do, particularly veterans, describe them as the repository of a group’s history, as the landmarks and parcel names are taught to the young. The women of Peleliu still perform a traditional court dance in front of tourists. Others have succeeded in tracing their memories of war and consider its aftermath. Their memories contrast markedly with those brought to the island from the two former belligerents.

In the kin-based society of Palau, life is closely tied to the all-important physical features of the land as productive resources, as the foundation of their social organization, and as bearer of their past. In the kin-based society of Palau, life is closely tied to the all-important physical features of the land as productive resources, as the foundation of their social organization, and as bearer of their past.

For most of the 30 years that Japan ruled Palau and Micronesia (1945-75), its interest in the colony was the exploitation of local resources. But as war approached, Japan made the fateful decision to locate Palau’s main airfield on Peleliu. Authorities uprooted two of the island’s five villages and seized their lands for the facility. Two other villages accepted these refugees, whose way of life had so abruptly been wracked. They clans gave home sites and garden plots to the newcomers, and everybody made awkward accommodation amidst this unprecedented misfortune.

Nobody anticipated the same fate would befall the North Island, but as American forces made landfall on 1944, the entire population of Peleliu was evacuated. They were taken in by the people of Ngaraard, a village on a large island to the north that escaped invasion. For the next 12 months the ‘ad ra Beliliou hid in the jungles to escape American air patrols that attacked all visible targets; gardening, gathering, and fishing at night kept them one step ahead of starvation. Some trekked to other villages seeking relatives and food. This dark year is remembered as a phantasmagoria of fear, hunger, illness, and occasional sudden death, made all the worse by the uncertainty over what had happened to their homeland in battle.

The succour they received from other Palauans was an expression of a people’s conceptions of history, which lies in the Pacific Ocean just north of the equator and 550 miles east of the Philippines. Palau is a sovereign nation with a compact of free association with the U.S. Sixty years after the invasion, evidence of the conflict on Peleliu remains more visible than on any comparable site in the Central Pacific. Today’s 575 residents are clustered in a single village (an equal number live in Palau’s urban centre, Koror), and 98 per cent consider the rest of the island appears to be largely unused. Beneath the re-grown forests, dotted with small gardens and taro paddies lie guns, fortifications, caves filled with weaponry (and in some, the unburied dead), and tons of unexploded ordnance. It is this seemingly ‘pristine’ quality of the battlefield that draws history-minded tourists.

History and land

In the kin-based society of Palau, knowledge of the past centres on histories of families and clans, especially on how they came to own certain lands. These histories are kept very private, and stories maintained by other kin groups are granted restricted access. Except that differing, competing versions of stories are ten- dentious, designed to promote the interests of the group holding the story. Although land is highly visible in a full-bodied society, these stories continue to be transmitted orally, while more public tales may be related in song, dance, chanted, or the visual arts. Kin relations are organized around control of land, the scarcest and most valuable resource on any island. Kin groups are identified with particular parcels, most of which are still held communally. These parcels are named and have stories behind them: how they were acquired and who lived on them. One’s identity and group membership are inseparably connected to the lands as productive resources, as the foundation of their social organization, and as bearer of their past.

As the repository of a group’s history, through its named parcels and beaches, landmarks, and danga. These are natural or man-made features - stones, trees, stone burial platforms, a garden - that serve as mnemonic devices to recall important stories. It’s not surprising, then, that the war memories of the ‘ad ra Beliliou are strongly coloured by their perspectives on what happens when control of these lands to productive resources, as the foundation of their social organization, and as bearer of their past.

The American forces provided the returnees with quonset huts and food in a new settlement, gestures much appreciated after the year of hardship. But the Americans abandoned the airbase in 1947, leaving the people to fend for themselves on an island whose fishing grounds had lost productivity and whose meagre soil had been paved over, poisoned, and washed away. Gardening was confined to taro swamps, and fish were less plentiful than before the war.

War and survival

Much of postwar life on Peleliu is comprehended in residents’ recollections over land tenure systems disrupted by coloni- salism and war. Japan and the suc- ceding U.S. administration both claimed half of Peleliu as government land. The U.S. effort to relinquish this land to the public was done in a manner blamed for creating endless disputes among clans, lineages, and individuals. This Gordian knot is slowly being unraveled by Western-style Palauan courts that are now the sole source of legal title. People complain that deeply private families have been revealed to public court proceedings to bolster land claims.

The five ancient villages have never been rebuilt, a source of great distress to the elderly as time removes the last people who can remember the way of life and all the important physical features of the community. The reasons for delay are many, lack of capital for reconstruction (but preparations from both cotributors were negligible) and despoliation of farmlands commonly cited. But residents acknowledge that the underlying explanations are the risk of building a home without secure title to land. Every ‘ad ra Beliliou still identifies himself as coming from one of the five villages, whose names are permanently shown on the map given to tourists. Chief titles con- tinue to be passed down, and oral histo- ries and parcel names are taught to the young. The way of life of the 1930s is gone forever. Palau’s is a monetized, globalized economy today. Yet only the actual return to place will provide the opportunity to renew ties to the one site each person considers his true home, the repository of his family’s history, and source of his identity.

After the United States opened Micronesia to tourism in the 1960s, Peleliu quickly attracted Japanese veterans and interested tourists, who were particular- ly anxious to commemorate the thousands of remains in the caves. The island also became a magnet for right-wing nation- ists, who erected a shrine and monuments praising their fallen heroes. Ever sensitive to matters affecting fam- ilies, the islanders express great sympathy toward those who lost kin there. Nonetheless, off and on since the late 1960s they have prohibited the collection of remains out of fear that once all had been taken away, Japanese tourism, and the vital income it produced, would stop. When Japanese Diet officials pressed to reverse the prohibition, his majesty Saburo seized the chance to voice Peleliu’s resentment at the cava- ller treatment its citizens had endured from the two nations that had so afflict- ed them. In fluent Japanese he demand- ed, ‘Did you Japanese and Americans get an invitation from us to come fight on our island of Peleliu? You destroyed everything and then went away and left us with nothing’.

Few Americans reach Peleliu today, and many of those who do, particularly vet- erans and their families, share with their Japanese counterparts a sense of per- sonal quest. Other tourists have suc- ceeded to our prurient fascination with war, curious about a site where its scars remain so evident, an island once deemed worthy of great sacrifice but now insignificant to ‘history’. The native inhabitants and what the war meant to them are superfluous to these pilgrim- ages, an attitude the islanders are well aware of: ‘We’re invisible to outsiders’, one chief put it.

Japan and the United States have raised monuments honouring their dead and declaring commitments to peace. The ‘ad ra Beliliou describe them as the ‘slang’ of the foreigners; stones that encode their memories of the war, their versions of the past. The islanders respect those memorials and grasp well their essence - what the Imperial Army and the U.S. Marines did to each other, and to Peleliu, in the autumn of 1944. Travellers to the island, by contrast, understand little of what happened to the native population engulfed by that catastrophe. Address- ing the ignorance of such visitors, another chief, Obakile’ol, noted that ‘they are only here for a short time’.

Catastrophe on Peleliu: Islanders’ memories of the Pacific War

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A nightmare in the making: war, nation and children's media in Japan, 1891-1945

Those in the field of Japanese and Asian studies are undoubtedly familiar with Japan's wartime propaganda of 'human bullets' (ninkuton), group suicide (shōdan gyokosai), and the ubiquitous 'one hundred million' (ichiboku), but readers may be surprised to learn that none of these tropes of national unity through sacrificial death were unique to the war years themselves. Nor were they primarily directed at adults.

The anniversary of Japan's defeat in the Pacific War gives us pause to reflect on the incredible human suffering generated by that conflict and to examine once again the mechanisms by which people can be socialized to kill and die in the name of sovereign, nation or god. Sadly, such an examination is all the more urgent in light of the problem of forgetting in historical writing. Please see the Asia-Pacific War 60 Years On: history & memory.

The culpability of adults in creating a manifold world of sacrificial death and unquestioning loyalty is clear. Their primary role was in 'educating' the 'lesser peoples' of Asia and their ultimate aim was to forge a 'new Asia'. However, we should not overestimate the role of mass media in the process, for it was through the actions of men that women, children and the elderly were victimized and prosecuted war. They have almost exclusively a masculine one. With very few exceptions, men have initiated and prosecuted war. They have also developed the tools of war from which nations and empires have been forged. From the stirrup and the long bow to napalm and the atomic bomb, men have been the principal agents in creating the technologies of war. In the modern world these technologies, to borrow Marx's phrase, 'weigh like a nightmare on the brain of the living'.

Men also created the print media tech-nologies that enabled generations of Japanese children to consume a fifty-year diet of victorious war and sacrificial death as an always noble, always male, and oft-times glorious adventure. We cannot say for sure exactly what impact this diet had on the young men who fought and died while brutalizing the peoples of Asia during the Pacific War. Sixty years after the fact, answers to these questions still remain elusive. Further analysis of those who created it, however, may bring us closer to understanding the relationship between the consumption of war as education and entertainment and the prosecution of war as political policy. Analyzing Japan as a case study will provide a deeper and perhaps new understanding of its modern history and the development of its national ethos. I hope it will also serve as a mirror in which we can see our own reflection as we memorialize and remember the great tragedy of six decades past, while we struggle with yet another kind of war in the young 21st century.

Owen Griffiths teaches Japanese and Asian History at Mount Allison University in Sackville, New Brunswick, Canada. His inter-ests include the history of the black market, the conscription of women, the militarization of everyday life, and the centrality of war and its remem-brances in national discourse. Please see the online version at www.iran.nl for full source notes.

Owen Griffiths

The Treasure

Monsters, the peach boy

From the earliest beginnings of modern Japan in 1868, war and heroic, sacrificial death occupied a central place in the stories and imagery children consumed as entertainment. These narratives collectively formed one of the most enduring themes in Japanese children's media throughout the first half of the 20th century. Decades before publishers of the 1930s and 1940s were compelled to represent war as a sacred undertaking of national survival and Asian liberation, children's media producers had begun creating adventure stories and morality tales based on the heroic and selfless patriotism of men in battle, dying, not for themselves, but in order to protect their greater good of the emperor/nation or for the liberation of the 'lesser peoples' of Asia. Thus, the increasingly single-minded glorification of manly, sacrificial death in war – what I have called the 'culture of death' – sees building from its origins in Edo period tales and novels, through the stories adults created for children and into the form to which it would be transformed in the wake of WWI. Between the early 1890s and the early 1930s numerous stories appeared in which Japan's mili-tary was pitted against one or more of the great powers in a fight to the death. The stories were remarkably consis-tent. Japan's military would first 'reduc-tively' engage the enemy and be anni-hilated due to their far superior technology. Then, at the end, a mysteri-ous piece of new technology would appear, usually commanded by child or child-adult partnership, to save the Japanese army and the nation. Drawing on its 'adventure novel' genre (biken shootsu- na) pioneered by Oshikawa Shunio in the post-Russian-Japanese War era, these stories were frequently first serialized in magazines like Shônen seki (Children's World) and Shônens kuruco (Boys' Club) and then published as book form (Kuwâ-hara 1987; Kats 1966).

Collectively these tales of adventure, heroism and death portrayed young boys, and some girls, with powerful didactic models with which children could imagine their future roles in the Japanese empire. And children's maga-zines were the perfect medium through which these stories could be transmit-ted. Due to their low cost and portability, children's magazines transcended geography and class and therefore per-formed an important mediatory func-tion linking home, school and play-ground. Whether consumed at home or consumed this media by choice rather than by fiat, magazines reflected chil-dren's subjective preferences to a degree that modern web technologies do not. Thus, the power of children's media, even when not overtly didactic, stemmed from its uniquely commercial impulse, its function as entertainment and its interplay with other forms of socialization and education.

Media, modernity and nation

Throughout this golden age of chil-dren's print media we see the reciprocal interaction of art and life, fact and fic-tion, and politics and entertainment. Here I have offered only a small sam-pling from an amazingly rich and diverse body of material to argue that the 'culture of death' so prevalent in Japan's Great War was forged. From the stirrup and the long bow to napalm and the atomic bomb, men have been the principal agents in creating the technologies of war. In the modern world these technologies, to borrow Marx's phrase, 'weigh like a nightmare on the brain of the living'.

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ft(1891 and began Japan's first ichioku (ninkuton), but readers may be surprised to see emerging during Japan's years of nationalist fervour in the 1890s, war and heroic, sacrificial death occupied a central place in the stories and imagery children consumed as entertainment. These narratives collectively formed one of the most enduring themes in Japanese children's media throughout the first half of the 20th century. Decades before publishers of the 1930s and 1940s were compelled to represent war as a sacred undertaking of national survival and Asian liberation, children's media producers had been creating adventure stories and morality tales based on the heroic and selfless patriotism of men in battle, dying, not for themselves, but in order to protect their greater good of the emperor/nation or for the liberation of the 'lesser peoples' of Asia. Thus, the increasingly single-minded glorification of manly, sacrificial death in war – what I have called the 'culture of death' – sees building from its origins in Edo period tales and novels, through the stories adults created for children and into the form to which it would be transformed in the wake of WWI. Between the early 1890s and the early 1930s numerous stories appeared in which Japan's military was pitted against one or more of the great powers in a fight to the death. The stories were remarkably consistent. Japan's military would first 'reduc-tively' engage the enemy and be annihilated due to their far superior technology. Then, at the end, a mysterious piece of new technology would appear, usually commanded by child or child-adult partnership, to save the Japanese army and the nation. Drawing on its 'adventure novel' genre (biken shootsu- na) pioneered by Oshikawa Shunio in the post-Russian-Japanese War era, these stories were frequently first serialized in magazines like Shônen seki (Children's World) and Shônens kuruco (Boys' Club) and then published as book form (Kuwâ-hara 1987; Kats 1966).

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Owen Griffiths
Anatomy of the Yushukan war museum: educating Japanese youth?

In celebration of its 130th anniversary, the Yasukuni Shrine renovated its war museum Yushukan. Reopened to the public in July 2002, the new museum features an exhibition space twice its previous size. The shrine hopes that the museum will play a central role in educating Japanese youth, as it did during wartime. But can it?

Takashi Yoshida

During the Natsume Rebellion of 1877, members of the government used a force, numbering only 30,000 yen to the military for the care of wounded soldiers. Some money was left over, and the nobles agreed to allocate the remainder to build an Exhibition Hall of Weapons. Giovanni Vincente Capponi, a Jesuit priest, was appointed by the Japanese government during the early Meiji period, designed a two-story Romanesque-style exhibition hall. It was named the Yasukuni, or the hall in which one may study under and commune with a noble-minded soul. The medieval Italian castle-like the Yasukuni, a symbol of modernization, coexisted alongside the traditional Shinto-style Yasukuni Shrine.

In 1934 the Kokubikan museum was opened, and, in 1934, the annexed Kokubokan (National Defense Hall) was added. The focus of the new museum was no longer limited to the wars against China and Russia. In the 1938 arrangement, visitors were first conducted upstairs to see artifacts from prehistory through to the late Tokugawa period (1600-1868). They were then guided to the first floor, where they saw materials related to the Meiji Restoration (1868), the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), the armed conflict in north China (1931-38), and the Manchurian Incident (1931-32). At the end of tour, the visitors saw cannons, small-scale paintings, and fighter planes placed in a large exhibition hall.

In contrast, the annexed Kokubokan was exclusively dedicated to modern warfare. One of its objectives was to enable visitors to experience modern warfare. It not only exhibited high-tech weapons of the time, such as radio, radar, fighter-mounted machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, and chemical agents; visitors were able to shoot air rifles at small tanks, fighters, and enemy combatants. These were real rifles modified to use compressed air instead of gun powder. Elsewhere, patrons were invited to don gas masks before being subjected to an actual tear gas assault. The Tokio Gas Co. was in charge of building the rooms, while the Institute for Science supplied the necessary equipment (Yushukan, 1898:61, 183, 306, 308).

The Kokubokan's emphasis on entertainment and hands-on experience was maintained in other sections. Visitors, operating a control stick, were able to drop virtual bombs from a heavy bomber. Once they had selected a target and pushed a button, a flashing light appeared to indicate where the bomb had hit. The model bomber also had a seat for a gunner, who was able to operate a mounted revolving machine-gun and shoot enemy fighters. In sum, by the late 1930s, both the Yasukuni and Kokubokan had taken on the function of reinforcing nationality, explaining the technology of modern warfare among Japanese youth. Japanese peace education has often been criticized for focusing on Japan's own victimhood rather than the destruction and atrocities inflicted by Japan on other nations. Nevertheless, Nikkyoshin [Japanese Teachers Union] teachers and anti-war activists desire credit for inspiring Japanese citizens with a sentimental aversion to war and right-wing extremism. Conservative politicians, including prime ministers and senior politicians, visit Yasukuni Shrine and try to imbue the site with a more positive image. However, the public relations problems of the Yushukan are unlikely to be neutralized by such appearances. So long as the public continues to identify the Yushukan with the groups of violent reactionaries, the shrine stands little chance of appealing to the Japanese mainstream. Nor are the new Yushukan's attempts to attract youth with pre-war-like hands-on attractions likely to have much impact in furthering its interpretation of Imperial Japan.

The new Yushukan has 20 exhibition halls, starting with 'Spirit of the Samurai' on the second floor. Artifacts suggest that the nation was created by Emperor Jimmu in 660 BCE and that many samurai had fought against foreign enemies to defend the nation since then. The second floor covers the passage of time from the Stone Age up to the full-scale war against China that started in 1894. Nearly the entire ground floor is dedicated to the 'Greater East Asia War', including 3,000 individual photographs of the 'enshrined gods'. All of them are said to have fought and died for the empire, and their letters and wills are exhibited. The large hall featuring kamikaze pilots and human torpedoes remains virtually unchanged from its predecessor. In general, the Yushukan's version of true Japanese history is a three-dimensional rendering of the views expressed in Kohayashi Yushinou's On War (Sensojiten) and Nishio Kanji's History of the Nation (Kokumin no rekishi), both of which argue that Imperial Japan liberated Asia from Western aggression. These volumes are available in the museum shop.

Can the Yushukan accomplish its mission?

The popularity of the Yushukan museum rose on several occasions prior to Japan's defeat, particularly in periods of war and imperial expansion. After the museum began to exhibit confiscated weapons from the Qing military, visitors skyrocketed from 50,000 to 250,000 a year. In 1905, the year that the Russo-Japanese War ended, more than 480,000 people visited the museum. After the war began with China in July 1937, visitors again increased significantly, with more than 910,000 visiting the museum that year (Yushukan 1938:477-89).

Particularly after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the Yushukan museum became popular among children. The average annual number of juvenile visitors between 1934 and 1936 was 21,474, while in 1937 more than 110,000 children passed through. Young visitors especially liked the participatory features of the Kokubokan (ibid.: 484-89). For example, the June 1934 issue of Boys' Club (Shōnen kurabu) informed its readers of the opening of the hall and its popularity among the visitors. Indeed, the wartime years were the heyday of these facilities, which enjoyed a substantial number of visitors and played a significant role in educating youth.

The Yushukan never recovered its prewar popularity. Although the museum continued to operate until Japan's defeat in 1945, it was closed by the Allied Powers in 1945 and, in 1952, the Yasukuni Shrine, which continued to perform these functions until Japan's defeat in 1945.

During the Occupation, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers closed the museum. In 1961, however, the administrators of the Yasukuni Shrine began to display modern Japanese history to young Japanese as it once did. It seems that the Yushukan's influence will remain limited, mainly due to its extremely negative, nationalistic image and the association that exists in the public mind between the shrine and right-wing extremists. Indeed, the Yushukan continues to serve as a Mecca for ultra-nationalist groups, who arrive at the shrine in trucks armed with loud speakers and who rarely hesitate to resort to violence and intimidation in pursuit of their political goals.

As the editor of the conservative journal Svis conveniently pointed out, many Japanese are allergic to the Yasukuni Shrine, and few teachers would advocate including the Shrine as a part of a school excursion. Indeed, Japanese high schools now often choose overseas destinations for field trips. In 2002, for example, more than 18,000 students visited South Korea. Although exact figures are unknown, some schools have visited such places as the House of Sharing and the Seodaemun Prison History Hall, both of which condemn Japanese colonialism in Korea.

It seems unlikely that, at least for the present, the Yushukan will be able to play as significant a role as it did during the war in spreading a heroic and ethnocentric narrative of the war among Japanese youth. Japanese peace education has often been criticized for focusing on Japan's own victimhood rather than the destruction and atrocities inflicted by Japan on other nations. Nevertheless, Nikkyoshin [Japanese Teachers Union] teachers and anti-war activists desire credit for inspiring Japanese citizens with a sentimental aversion to war and right-wing extremism. Conservative politicians, including prime ministers and senior politicians, visit Yasukuni Shrine and try to imbue the site with a more positive image. However, the public relations problems of the Yushukan are unlikely to be neutralized by such appearances. So long as the public continues to identify the Yushukan with the groups of violent reactionaries, the shrine stands little chance of appealing to the Japanese mainstream. Nor are the new Yushukan's attempts to attract youth with pre-war-like hands-on attractions likely to have much impact in furthering its interpretation of Imperial Japan.
Negotiating colonialism: Taiwanese literature during the Japanese occupation

Research on the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan (1895-1945) has been booming in recent years, especially since the lifting of martial law in 1987. Scholarship on the period’s literary production, however, focuses on works containing explicit anti-colonial stances to such an extent that writings in other styles and those less critical of colonial rule have been disregarded.

The first two decades of Taiwan’s Japanese period were marked by armed anti-colonial movements that ultimately failed. The Japanese colonisers’ brutal suppression made the Taiwanese intelligentsia turn to cultural movements to renew their nation’s thinking as an alternative way to fight against colonialism. In 1921, the Taiwan Cultural Association (Taiwan bunka kyokai) was established, launching an island-wide cultural reform programme to educate people. To accommodate this call for cultural enlightenment, a new strand of literature written in the style of vernacular Chinese emerged in the early 1920s. Usually referred to as the Taiwan New Literature movement, it played a vital part in Taiwanese people’s anti-colonial resistance.

Taiwan New Literature

Owing to the colonial context, the Taiwan new literature movement was from the very beginning multi-lingual and socio-politically engaged. In addition to works written in Chinese, there were works written in Japanese and Taiwanese. The key figures in the first stage of the movement, such as Lai He, hailed as the ‘father of Taiwan New Literature’, and Chen Yingzhen, the ‘father of Taiwan New Literature’, established, launching a new literature movement written in the style of vernacular Chinese emerged in the early 1920s. Usually referred to as the Taiwan New Literature movement, it played a vital part in Taiwanese people’s anti-colonial resistance.

In 1931, the left-leaning Taiwan People’s Party was dissolved and its leader, Lin Pei-Yin, passed away; many leftwing Taiwanese intellectuals were apprehended. This led to the decline of socio-political movements in Taiwan; writers turned to literary movements and devoted themselves to writing. This ironically heralded a period of maturer Taiwanese Literature. In this second stage, numerous literary societies were established, and literary journals launched. Writers began to explore new artistic trends and to take a wider range of themes. Yang Ku’s ‘Newspaper Boy’ (1934), Weng Nao’s ‘Remaining Snow’ (1933) and Long Yingzong’s ‘A Small Town with Papaya Trees’ (1937) are three distinctive pieces written in Japanese from the second stage of Taiwanese New Literature.

Inspired by Lai He’s leftwing thinking, Yang Ku furthered by bringing class analysis and internationalism to his writing. His award-winning short story ‘Newspaper Boy’ is an account of a foreign student’s exploitation by his boss, and his later support of unions as a means of fighting back. Set in a period of intense recession in Japan, the student leads a poverty-strickend life. When he is about to give up, a Japanese worker, Tanaka, offers his help. Contrasting the exploitative boss and the generous Tanaka, the story emphasises opposition between capitalists and labourers rather than between Japanese and Taiwanese. In fact, Yang does not divulge until the second half of the story that the student is from Taiwan. Newspaper Boy ends with the Taiwanese student identifying with Japanese labourers and joining the union movement, embracing a universal and humanistic compassion for the proletariat instead of a provincial nationalism.

Written in the third person, Remaining Snow recounts Lin Mouzheng’s fashionable student life in 1930s Tokyo. Caught between his Japanese lover Kimiko and his old Taiwanese love Yuzhi, Lin ultimately realises that he is not in love with either and decides to stay in Tokyo to pursue his dream of becoming an actor. Lin’s idèle strolling into Shinjuku coffee shops, and his taste for western classical music and foreign plays conveys the modernist temperament of the work. Lin’s ideas of love are likewise modern; he is a flâneur constantly seeking his next object of desire. Caught between two competing love relationships (cultural identities), Lin refuses a fixed identity and chooses an ever-changing aesthetic, urban lifestyle. The emphasis on individual perceptions opens new possibilities for Taiwanese Literature, free from the tangle of question of nationalism.

Long’s A Small Town with Papaya Trees recounts the pessimism of Taiwanese intellectuals, living in a suffocating small town, the protagonist resents Taiwanese-Japanese inequality and the arranged marriage into which his lover is forced. In glowing copy, where the protagonist abandons himself to alcohol, signifies the no-way-out plight of the colonised. In contrast to Lai He and Yang Ku’s spirited resistance, and unlike Weng Nao’s modernist disposition, Long’s portrait of weak and hollow Taiwanese bourgeois intellectuals is itself a sad caricature of Japanese colonialism.

Imperial subjects?

During the eight-year Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), the Japanese propagated the Imperial-subject Movement (kominsha undo), a series of assimilation campaigns to mould Taiwanese people’s unquestioning loyalty to Japan, which included the establishment of the Imperial-subject Public Service Association (kominsha hokoku-kai) in 1941. Taiwanese writers were requested to eulogise the Japanese national spirit and produce a masculine, optimistic literature to assist in the war effort, leading to the so-called imperial-subject literature addressing Taiwanese people’s spiritual distress throughout the process of imperialisation and the pro-Japan faction. Taiwan anti-Japanese works of Chen Huquan and Zhou Jinbo, prominent themes were the yearning for the modern, urban, progressive Japan that would replace the urge to reform the vulgar Taiwanese culture through imperialisation.

The support of colonial policy and apparent pro-Japan stance in these works stirred controversies in post-1987 Taiwan. Scholars held different views on how to read the imperial-subject literature. Some were understanding; Zhang Liangze called for reading imperia-subject literature with a serious attitude. Chen Yingzhen, on the other hand, declared ‘there is no imperial-subject literature. All are protest literature’. (Ye, 1990:112). Others felt these works constituted an imperial-subject literature and an accomplice of Japanese colonialism (Chen, 1987:15) while Lin Ruiming, though not as radical as Chen, firmly stressed that ‘imperial-subject’ writers should not ‘shirk their responsibility’. (Lin, 1995: 342). These debates highlighted the complexity of the times and circumstances to write. Concepts such as ‘pro-Japan’ and ‘anti-Japan’ are needed.

With the lifting of martial law and the prevalence of national movements over the past three decades, the importance of Taiwanese literature during the Japanese occupation is growing. As part of the anti-Japanese resistance, it departed from classical Chinese tradition and underinges the modern, urban development and maturates. This opulent literary legacy illustrates the painful process of these writers’ constructions of selfish and negotiates with the colonial condition, providing us with a complex picture of the workings of colonialism.

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Negotiating colonialism: Taiwanese literature during the Japanese occupation

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Zhang Liangze 張良澤, 1995: ‘Taiwan wenxue de min shi (Spiritu-
Connecting the experiences of the Sino-Japanese and Asia-Pacific Wars

How were the Sino-Japanese and Asia-Pacific Wars related to one another? In terms of military strategy, competition for raw materials, diplomacy and the like, historians have long acknowledged connections between the conflicts, and how one prefigured the other. Yet, beyond the obvious military-strategic links, other kinds of inter-relationships between developments in the China theater and in other parts of Asia subsequently occupied by Japan have received much less attention, particularly in terms of transcultural national history.

For their part, many Japanese who took part in the invasion were overwhelmed by the Indonesian welcome, and were quick to see in Indonesia proof of the world-historical righteousness of Japan’s mission as Asia’s leader and liberator. Dutch resistance was, as one Diamond-Blackmirror telegram put it in Java - reinforced by what they saw as uncanny racial, linguistic and cultural similarities between Indonesians and Japanese - as confirmation of a ‘fresh start’ for Asia as well as a ‘home-coming’ to the long-lost Asian brethren described in Japan’s own propaganda.

Northeast Asian roots

While Japan’s message was new and appealing to many Indonesians, for Chinese, Koreans, and others who bore the brunt of Japanese expansionism in Northeast Asia, the language of ‘liberation’ and ‘return to Asia’ had a familiar ring and by now hollow ring. This was no coincidence, for while it was now direct- ed at Southeast Asians, the message of ‘Greater Asia’ was originally meant for Northeast Asian consumption. As Winston Churchill more critically noted: ‘It was not, at last, only China which was to be dis- tributed to, the Sino-Japanese War serves

The case of Japanese-Indonesian rela- tions in occupied Java and their relation- ship to the Sino-Japanese War serves as a brief example. When Japanese forces landed on Java in March 1942, they brought with them a stirring, revolu- tionary message: Japan’s occupation of Indonesia represented neither imper- ialist aggression nor a local version of Western colonialism, but the realization of a world-historical mission to ‘liberate’ Japan’s Asian brethren from Western capitalism and colonialism, and to build a harmonious, ‘Asian’ order transcend- ing modernity’s social ills. In ancient times, Asia had been a unified and powerful cultural whole; the success of Japan’s new Asia-building project depended on a cultural return to the shared Asian values and unity that Western imperialism, capitalism, and individualism had undermined. Japan alone among Asian societies in having maintained its political autonomy and Eastern cultural essence while mid- dle-aged Western science and technology, was uniquely, ‘naturally’ qualified to lead this Asian renaissance.

Java’s indigenous population had long been suffering under Dutch colonial domination, and many, particularly among its educated elite, were in search of a new post-colonial order. Many Indonesians thus welcomed the Japan- ese and were captivated by their prom- ises, particularly given that beyond occa- sional contact with local Japanese shopkeepers – who had an overwhelm- ingly positive reputation – Indonesians had little direct experience of Japan and its empire. The demonstration of Japan- ese power represented by the rollback of the Americans, British, and Dutch in the Pacific between December 1941 and March 1942, unprecedented in speed and scope, was further incentive to fol- low Japan’s lead. And while many Indonesians were aware that Japan had been waging war in China for several years, longstanding class and racial ten- sions between the indigenous popula- tion and the Chinese in Dutch Java - who dominated the lower reaches of the economy and were widely perceived as capitalist-colonial henchmen of the Dutch rulers - offset the potential for anti-Japanese solidarity.

The Japanese ideology of ‘Greater Asia’ that took shape in the 1930s arose in, and reflected, this specific ‘late imperi- alist’ context. The nominal political ‘independence’ of Manchukuo, along with its rhetoric of ‘racial harmony and broth- erhood’ - in what was little more than a Japanese puppet-state - were expressions of its contradictions. Above all, treasonous Chinese communist-inspired full-scale war in the Chinese heartland produced the social and ideological condi- tions whereby what had started as a relatively straightforward imperialist mission had become, in the eyes of many Japanese, something much more noble and profound. This Chinese resistance was, to many Japanese, who expected to deliver a quick, decisive blow to the ‘renegade’ forces of Chiang Kai-shek when the con- flict turned into wars, the Japanese found themselves in a military and moral quagmire; continued mobilization of a ‘tired populace and ‘pacification’ of the ‘inscrutably resistant Chinese demand- ed a cause that transcended the old jus- tifications for empire - ideally, a cause that could transcend empire itself.

Yet, despite increasingly sophisticated Japanese, attempts to justify the war as a holy mission to estab- lish a ‘Greater Asia’ and the ‘Asia Pacific Sphere’ and ’liberate Asia’ from West- ern colonial domination – ideas that res- onated profusely in Japanese society – largely failed to stick a chord among Chinese. The shocking brutality of the conflict, continued Japanese racism and arrogance, the complex structure of Chi- nese domestic social and political rela- tions, and, if this were not enough, the accumulated weight of history in the form of a common perception of Japan and the Japanese as scheming, self- aggrandizing ‘imperialists’ – in tandem with longstanding assumptions of Chi- nese cultural superiority over these ‘political’ neigh- bour – inhibited local receptivity to Japanese claims of acting as ‘Asia’s lib- erator’, let alone any legitimacy as Asia’s ‘leader’.

It is only against this highly charged and contested Northeast Asian forma- tive background that Japanese ideolo- gy and propaganda in Southeast Asia – and with its revolutionary evocation of an empire that could transcend imperialist, an Asian brotherhood that could transcend capitalism, an Asian modernity – needs to be understood. For reasons discussed briefly above, Java’s population proved more than ever their Chinese counterparts to ideas of Japanese occupation as ‘Asia’s alterna- tive to Western rule and modernity. For their part, Japanese responses to this situation – in many ways almost a sense of religious redemption for themselves, their nation, and its impe- rial project – must be understood in the context of frustrations built up in the course of the China conflict. They reflect the degree to which Chinese resistance had threatened to under- mine the legitimacy of Japan’s empire and how much Japan had invest- ed in the imperial project.

Recalling the earlier struggles and frustra- tions of a Japanese propaganda unit in mid-1942 column, news- paper editor Shimizu Nobuo articulated the sense of relief and newfound confi- dence among Japanese in Java – as well as the precious exemptions on resolving Japan’s ‘China problem’ which prefig- ured the Japanese experience in Indone- sia and elsewhere. Where Chinese resistance had previously left Japan’s imperial spokesmen ‘wordless’, the warm Southeast Asian reception now seemed to provide Japan with a long- sought ‘reply’.

There is a story of the China Pacification Unit (Shina unshonbu). They argued that Japan and China have the same script and are of the same race (édōnin dōsha), they are brothers, and they should proceed with hands joined. Someone in the audience replied - Alright, But China is the older brother.

It is said the members of the pacification unit had no words to answer this for some time. How wonderful if they had been able to reply immediately.

It is a problem of history – when you are properly aware of Japan’s history, the answers are simply simple.

Japan has always been leader of the Asia- Pacific sphere from ancient times – if you know this history, that is enough.

Japan has always been constructing China - if you know this history, that is enough.

We are now seeing this truth with our own eyes in the Greater East Asia War.

We must be aware that this truth before our eyes has been continuously repeated in China since ancient times.

What is true in China is, again, true in the southern regions. Japanese people, take great pride!

It is an irony of history that Shimizu’s closing assertions were eventually to prove correct, albeit hardly in the way that Shimizu, and the many Japanese whose views he represented, might have hoped. As Indonesians who lived through Japan’s increasingly exploitative and brutal three and a half-year occupation will attest - and despite Japanese claims and Indonesian hopes to the contrary - it was inevitable that the imperial chickens Japan had raised in China would eventually come home to roost in Southeast Asia. For all its idealism, the promise of ‘Greater Asia’ was no match for the inex- erably imperial political, economic, and cultural logic of Japan’s wartime regime. But more than this: in its very contradic- tions, ‘Greater Asia’ was not only a vivid sign of its late-imperial times - it was also, in itself, an expression of Japan’s late-imperial logic.

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C

onventional accounts of the two conflicts tend to lump Japanese and Asian experiences into one basket with the shared labels ‘imperialism versus national liberation’ and ‘resistance versus resistance.’ To a certain extent this remains accurate, but there were impor- tant differences between how Japan’s occupation of China and its occupations in Southeast Asia were apprehended and experienced by occupier and occu- pied. At the same time, the two conflicts were related in complex ways.

Coming home

Within the context of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese experience in Southeast Asia is one of the most compelling, and dis-turbing examples of the import of a Western imperial logic. The case of Japanese-Indonesian relations in occupied Java provides an excellent illustration of this.

For many Japanese who took part in the invasion, the experience of Indonesian welcome, and the quick to see in Indonesia proof of the world-historical righteousness of Japan’s mission as Asia’s leader and liberator.

Japanese desires were, as one Diamond-Blackmirror telegram put it in Java - reinforced by what they saw as uncanny racial, linguistic and cultural similarities between Indonesians and Japanese - as confirmation of a ‘fresh start’ for Asia as well as a ‘home-coming’ to the long-lost Asian brethren described in Japan’s own propaganda.

Up to the 1930s, Japanese justifications for imperial expansion and colonial rule had largely mirrored those of the West- ern powers: the protection of Japan’s military-strategic ‘spheres of interest’, the securing of vital raw materials, land, and markets, and in more idealistic terms, the bringing of ‘civilization’ and enlightenment to ‘backward peoples’, the ‘suppression of disorder’, ‘banditry’ and the like. From around the late 1920s, however, alongside increasing calls for domestic social renovation - a more aggressive expansionism came to the fore. The push for internal reform and external expansion emerged against the backdrop of Japan’s Great Depression, which brought suffering domes- tically and heightened protectionism and competition between the imperial pow- ers internationally. The shift was further fueled by the fear of the Soviet Union and its commitment to exporting commu- nist revolution, along with increasing- ly assertive Chinese nationalism. From 1931, the empire-building project in Manchuria became the focus of Japan- ese power represented by the rollback of its empire. The demonstration of Japan- ese ambitions, and was billed as a model solution to Japan’s domestic problems.

Imperial crisis

At the same time, the interwar period was a time of crisis in the legitimacy of imperialism itself. Chinese nationalist resistance to Japanese encroachment was a regional play on the global theme of anti-imperialism, which was gaining the moral high ground as the ‘trend of the times’, articulated by such spokes- men as Mahatma Gandhi and encour- aged by the Marxist-Leninist criticism of imperialism and Woodrow Wilson’s acknowledgement of the ‘right to national self-determination’. Just as the Great Depression and crisis of interna- tional capitalism made the securing of empire seem more important than ever to Japan - and to Britain, Holland, and France – empire as such was becoming harder to justify, internationally as well as domestically.

The message of ‘Greater Asia’ was originally meant for Northeast Asian consumption. Wittingly or not, Chinese resistance played a critical role in its making, elaboration, and radicalization.

Despite its idealism, the promise of ‘Greater Asia’ was never realised. As Indonesians who lived through Japan’s occupation will attest - and despite Japanese claims and Indonesian hopes to the contrary - it was inevitable that the imperial chickens Japan had raised in China would eventually come home to roost in Southeast Asia. For all its idealism, the promise of ‘Greater Asia’ was no match for the inex- erably imperial political, economic, and cultural logic of Japan’s wartime regime. But more than this: in its very contradic- tions, ‘Greater Asia’ was not only a vivid sign of its late-imperial times - it was also, in itself, an expression of Japan’s late-imperial logic.

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Borneo constituencies: Japanese rule and its legitimation

Thinking of wartime occupations, we tend to picture suppression, looting, and violent and arbitrary rule. For the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, the prevailing image is one of a brutal regime ruling Indonesian society at gunpoint and exploiting the lives of thousands, while incompetent administrators ruined the country. Or was the Japanese period a prelude to revolution and the harbinger of independence?

I was, of course, both. Trying to avoid generalisations which judge a period by its outcomes, it might be useful to look at the zaman Jepang (Japanese period) differently, by assessing the workings of the Japanese state in Indonesia. Instead of looking at the effects of occupation for different peoples or classes, one might examine how Japanese rule operated as a state, more specifically the way it produced or tried to produce a certain legitimacy.

I am not concerned here with legitimacy according to international law, but with the inner workings of the Japanese state in Indonesia. Recent thinking on rulers’ legitimacy stresses the mechanisms by which rulers legitimate their power and through which they influence their subjects to accept their authority – it is the process of legitimisation that is considered crucial to the workings of the state.

Another channel of legitimation was the bureaucracy. The Japanese had initially proclaimed the continuation of Dutch structures of government, and Dutch administrative labels and terms were often retained, such as ‘resident’ and ‘keur’ (statute), even ‘ambtenaar’ (civil servant). Taxes remained unchanged from prewar days, only the obligatory corvée labour, abolished by the Dutch, was re-instituted. An important change, however, was the employment of local personnel in administration, who were often ex-slaves who had been freed and formally removed from slavery. On such grounds, they had entered a new era. The fact of victory was accompanied by the profession of Japanese liberation ideology: according to the newspaper Borneo Shim bun, Borneo had been teplus dari perboedakannja (freed from its slavery) and was entering a new era. The word which, in various forms, loomed large in the newspapers. Majarahat (one’s land) was reformulated as majarakat, a word which was used to denote ‘free land’, as it did on Java and elsewhere.

Makawa, Kaori. 2002. ‘How the Japanese soldier was perceived in Borneo and Malaya’, Tohoku University Southeast Asia Studies, 207.


Maekawa, Kaori. 2002. ‘How the Japanese soldier was perceived in Borneo and Malaya’, Tohoku University Southeast Asia Studies, 207.
The debate on Nishida and the Kyōto School has been overshadowed by the debate on Heidegger. One reason for this ‘Heidegger-factor’ in the debate on the Kyōto School rests merely with strategic considerations of some of the debate’s participants. But philosophical parallels can indeed be drawn between Nishida and Heidegger, and there are also direct links passing through some of Nishida’s disciples, who studied in Germany. One of these parallels might be a common concern with – or a cer- tain affinity to – a word Heidegger calls the ‘ordinary self’, which, as it is, is incapable of knowing the truth, and has to be ‘overcome’, so to speak. It was this concern, or resentment, which nour- ished Heidegger’s understanding of the national socialist movement as a ‘national revolution’ against the ‘hopeless frenzy of technology’. And it was out of the same concern that philoso- phers of the Kyōto School embraced the war as the most effective means to what was propagated in war-time Japan as the ‘overcoming of modernity’. Moreover, for them – as for Socrates – the problem of the ‘self’ was closely linked with the problem of the ‘political’. They were aware of the dangers of not understanding the political and the ‘world’, and might therefore help to illumi- nate the relationship between philoso- phy and politics in war-time Japan.***

Notes
1. Plat. Symposium, 215 d 1-216 a, modified by author.
2. Alcibiades I, 139 d, 140 a.
4. The following quotes are from a series of three round-table-discussions (Sekai- shinketsu tachiba to Nihon, ‘Ti ko ken me no innere zu rekugaku’, and ‘Styppeko no te jugakkugy’), held by four philosophers of the Kyōto School (Nishitani Kenji, Kiyomy iwan, Kôsa Kamasaki, Suzuki Shigetaka). These symposia were published in the popular journal Chô kon in january 1942, April 1942 and January 1945
5. Chô kon, January 1942, p.192
9. Christopher S. Goto-Jones has recently highlighted the significance of indige- nous Japanese, non-Western traditions of political thought to a proper under- standing of Nishida’s political philoso- phy, stressing in particular the critical Sōtâkei (the ‘Buddhist’ politics of awakening). II. Indeed, the call for an over- coming of the ordinary, selfish self as a pre-condition for good government implies a criticism of the state of mind of ordinary men such as the imperialist political and military leaders of war-time Japan. Some have identified a similar kind of criticism in the call of Nishida’s disciples for an ‘overcoming of modernity’. Still, ambiguity remains. For before the establishment of peace in the war, the salvation of humankind, and the emergence of a Buddhist state envi- ronished by Nishida at the end of his life, there was the purgatory of war histo- ry, the affirmation of the war as an asce- tic exercise. And so in the Kyōto School’s concern with the overcoming of the ‘ordinary self’ we may also find an answer to the question asked by the Hei- degger expert Otto Pöggeler, ‘how could the Kyōto School get so close to the war parties?’. The historical significance of this question, however, must not be underestimated: neither Alcibiades, nor the Japanese ‘war parties’ ever really lis- tened to the philosophers’ advice: ‘you have to attend to yourself first!’

Christiane Uh!
The ICAS secretariat hopes all participants books contesting for the ICAS Book art publications in the exhibition space. Eries who showcased their latest state of the gramme book and all information readily USB-stick. This made for a portable pro- information pertaining to ICAS 4 on an US-votory Committee and ICAS had in mind.

The convention’s focus is on panels. Only 1 per cent of which were institutional and organized top down. We thank all participating institutions and hope that more institutions will follow suit to use ICAS as a platform. Likewise we thank the scholars who organized 30 per cent of the panels. The remaining panels were put together by the Selection Committee on the basis of individual abstracts. These were grouped under the general theme of ICAS such as Global Asia, Identity, Economy and Knowledge.

The 280 panels ranged from Urbanization, Megalopolis and Regional Development to Investigating Law and the Impact of ASEAN to Bad Girl Writers. On average a panel consisted of four papers but there were also panels exceeding 10 papers. In all more than 1200 papers were pre- sented. Out of the sheer number of abstracts the idea was born to put all information pertaining to ICAS 4 on an USB-stick. This made for a portable pro- gramme book and all information readily accessible.

We were happy to welcome about twenty key publishers in the field of Asian Studies who showcased their latest state of the art publications in the exhibition space. We thank them for the more than forty books contesting for the ICAS Book Prizes.

The ICAS secretariat hopes all participants enjoyed an inspiring and stimulating conven- tion in Shanghai and invites you to join ICAS 5 in Kuala Lumpur in 2007.

Barbara Weisen Andaya

Most of us, and particularly historians, are committed to the idea that the past has something to say about the future. Individuals have always played a key role as linguistic and cultural mediators, with far-reaching influence - both posi- tive and negative - exercised by the written interpretations they produced. People who are well acquainted with cultures that are not their own will be as important in shaping the glo- bal relationships underpinning Asia’s future as they have been in the past.

From early times Southeast Asia, being at the cross roads between India and China, offers a multitude of examples of visitors who recorded their impressions, sometimes simply as an official report, sometimes intended for wider dissemi- nation. Few college textbooks on Southeast Asia, for instance, would fail to mention the description of Angkor (ref. by Zhou Daguan, a member of a Chinese embassy who spent a year in Cambodia at the end of the 13th century. In a very different time, and in a very different place, we can consult the report of a Persian scribe included in a manuscript from the Siamese capital of Ayutthaya in 1760, which remarks on the willingness of the Thai ruler to learn about the kings of the inhabited world, their behavior, customs and principles. … He sent everywhere for pictures depicting the mode of being and the courts of for- eign kings."

It is important to recognize that this was a conversation, not a monologue. Over time, individuals from Southeast Asia traveled to distant lands, and detailed their experiences for pos- terity. In the early nineteenth century, for instance, the Riau scholar Raja Ahmad and his young son Raja Ali made the pil- grimage; not only meeting some of the most eminent Mus- lim leaders in Mecca but going to Medina with a caravan of two thousand camels. One can only imagine the enthralled audiences who listened to Raja Ahmad’s stories following his safe return. Although mental adjustments are impossible to quantify, it is not difficult to imagine that such experiences could reshape an individual’s views of his or her own society. Many of us can attest the subtle attitudinal shifts that travel and overseas living has brought about in our own lives. Cross- cultural conversations among ordinary people, most notably the young, lie at the heart of international education.

Scholars who have devoted their academic lives to the study of Asia can play important roles in furthering the vision of universality, partly as researchers whose work can contribute to cross-cultural understanding, but more specifically as teachers of future generations and sponsors and facilitators of student exchanges.

There has been a proliferation of programs that allow students to spend time in another country, as students or for an extend- ed visit. The bulk of exchanges have been between the West and Asian societies, while a significant and growing number of young people from Asia spend time in other Asian countries. The knowledge they acquire reaches far beyond the acquisition of language skills; what is important is learning “how things are done” in another culture. Ultimately this kind of knowledge demands an awareness and non-judgmental acceptance of differ- ence, and these values can never be learnt too early. If we accept that the future of Asia, with all its promise, will ultimately rest with its youth, then the education of a globally perceived generation is a matter of the highest priority.

Historians of premodern Southeast Asia have learned to dis- tinguish between observers with only a passing knowledge of the other” and those with much greater experience in the region. Two examples of early “exchange students” whose experiences continue to speak to us across the years illustrate the kind of person I have in mind. The first is a young Chinese man, Wang Duhai, who spent ten years in Java between about 1783 and 1793, and whose account of Java written in 1792, reprinted at least seven times, was first translated into English in 1849. Having apparently failed the examinations, and anxious to help his debt-ridden family, Wang followed the path of numerous other young Chinese, and left for the “south- ern seas.” He traveled in Java, entered service as a tutor with a wealthy Batavian Chinese family, and married before even- tually returning to China.

Despite sometimes caustic comments, Wang Duhai obviously enjoyed living in Java. He appears to have been comfortable speaking Malay, and his account, Claudine Salmon tells us, introduces 85 Malay words in Chinese characters. He also knew something of other societies in the region, noting as many as 17 different ethnic groups, and commenting on dis- tumitions between the Malay, Bugis and Javanese language and writing systems. He spoke of attending shadow plays and poet- ry recitations; his account of household interiors and the ways guests were received speaks to his personal relationships, and presumably his own marriage to a local woman. Wang’s pri- mary interests revolved around trade, but he seems to have developed a passion for tropical vegetation, and collected the names of many plants. The same interest apparently led him
to compile considerable detail about the collection of certain rare commodities like bêche de mer, swallows’ nests, birds of paradise, bezoar stones, and tortoise shell. His readers would have been reminded that such activities were never purely an economic matter. Those collecting birds’ nests, Wang tells us, must select an auspicious day and success can only be guar¬anteed through the propitiation of spirits in songs and dance. The special activities of daily life, Wang’s observations lies in the fact that he was what we would now call a participant observer, and one can sense his personal enjoyment of Java. Much of his pleasure he attributed to the emphasis his host cultures placed on food and rest. “Even if there is an urgent affair, they do not attend to it immediately.” He paid Java the greatest compli¬ment of all: even the rice was superior to that of China! It could certainly be argued that Wang’s gratitude to his rich merchant hosts encouraged him to offer an especially positive picture. On the other hand, it is also likely that Wang emphasized the appealing features of a non-Chinese to encourage his compa¬triots to think more deeply about their own.

My second example of the “inquiring mind” concerns John Adolphus Pope, a fifteen-year-old apprentice born in 1771 in Plymouth employed on an English country ship from 1785 to 1788. His time in Southeast Asia thus coincides with that of Wang Dahai, and again what struck me when I read his let¬ters was the way he could have already made friends. “Those who say the Malays have no virtues,” he wrote, “have never been received by them as a child and have been treated with kindness—domesticated, I may say in their families as far as the preju¬dice he attributed to the emphasis his host cultures placed on food and rest. “Even if there is an urgent affair, they do not attend to it immediately.” He paid Java the greatest compli¬ment of all: even the rice was superior to that of China! It could certainly be argued that Wang’s gratitude to his rich merchant hosts encouraged him to offer an especially positive picture. On the other hand, it is also likely that Wang emphasized the appealing features of a non-Chinese to encourage his compa¬triots to think more deeply about their own.

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Global energy consumption depends largely on fossil fuels: coal, oil and natural gas. Growing consumption in rapidly industrializing East and Southeast Asia and industrializing countries elsewhere causes a steep increase in demand while large scale oil consumption in industrialized countries continues (the US consumes 25 percent of the world’s oil production).

According to the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) global oil consumption will rise from 83 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2004 to 100 million bbl/d in 2015, further increasing to 120 million bbl/d by 2035. Resources of operating oil fields are decreasing while resources in newly discovered oil and gas fields are disappointing and the price for a barrel of oil goes up. Global oil production will not be able to meet this rapidly rising demand. Major oil consumers will have to follow more aggressive policies to sat- isfy their oil needs, and military inter- vention to safeguard oil production and export will become more likely, as has been the case in Iraq as part and parcel of oil policy strategies. The space age has dramatically impacted the modern world, and the ‘colonial’ economy, dominated by the Dutch, to a ‘national’ one in which indige- nous business assumed control. Shifts in command and management of the econo- my are beyond the scope of this struc- tural and political alignment. This NIOD project explores this transformation, study- ing the late-colonial era as well as the Japanese occupation and the nationalism of the Sukarno period. Two issues are given special attention: Indonesianisation (increased opportunities for indigenous Indonesians in the economy) and nationalisation, in particular the expropriation of Dutch cor- porate assets in Indonesia in 1957-58.

The project’s main goal is to combine the database of the online database in the centre of the debate.

The ABIA Index volume 1 is available at EIA. Volume 2 is available at www.brl.nl

Coordinator: Ellen Raven

www.abia.nl

Changing Labour Relations in Asia (CLARA)

Labour relations in different parts of Asia are undergoing considerable changes and experiences in terms of their national economies, their links with inter- national markets and the nature of state intervention. This programme aims to understand these changes comparatively and historically, focusing on five overlap- ping themes: the labour process, labour mobility, labour consciousness, gendered labour and labour laws and labour move- ments.

Coordinator: Ratna Saptari

Transnational Society, Media, and Citizenship

This multidisciplinary network studies the complex nature of contemporary cultural identities and the impact of the global- ization of information and communica- tion technologies (ICTs) on the (re-) construction of lifestyles. Although the programme is based in the Netherlands, the projects are carried out at numerous fieldwork sites.

Coordinator: Peter van der Veer

> Networks

ABIA South and Southeast Asian Art and Archaeology Index (EIA)

The ABIA Index online database covers publi- cations on prehistory, archaeology, and art history, material culture, epigraphy, palaeo- graphy, numismatics, and related disciplines.

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> Projects

Socio-Genetic Marginalization in Asia

The development and application of new biomedical and genetic technologies have important socio-political implications. This NWO/ASSR/IIAS research pro- gramme aims to gain insight into the ways in which the use of and monopoly over genetic information and influence on population policies, environmental ethics and biomedical and agricultural practices in various Asian religious and secular cul- tures will further intensify.

EIA. Volume 2 is available at www.brl.nl

Coordinator: Ratna Saptari

Trans-Himalayan database development: China and the Subcontinent (Phase I)

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The ABIA Index volume 1 is available at EIA. Volume 2 is available at www.brl.nl

Coordinator: Ellen Raven

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The Socio-Genetic Marginalization in Asia Programme (SMAP)

SMAP, the Socio-genetic Marginalization in Asia Programme, which started off in August 2004, is a research programme set up with the support of the Netherlands Science Organisation (NWO), IIAS, and the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research (ASSR). Exploring cultural, social and economic aspects of the role of genetic technologies played in the area of state organisation, population policies, health care systems and research regulation in China, India and Japan, SMAP is expected to shed light on how differences in the application of modern genetic technologies generate different practices. The programme focuses on the ways in which (universal) regulation for genetic sampling by international companies and universities leads to disputable research practices among vulnerable populations; (II) how bioethical differences between healthcare systems are expressed in the different meanings allocated to concepts, such as informed consent, health, and family values; and, (III) the consequences of development priorities and practices of genetic screening for the livelihood and identities of diverging social groups.

Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner

A sia boasts the main economic players of the 21st century, China, India and Japan especially will play main roles in the field of science, particularly in applied modern technologies. The concept of socio-genetic marginalization, which is central to SMAP, draws attention to the consequences of the practice of relating the social to the (assumed) genetic make-up of people, regardless of the relevance of such connections. Central are the socio-cultural and financial consequences of the use of genetic information. The projects of SMAP are conceptualised through three empirical research projects outlined below.

Genomics, population-politics and local traditions

Governments in China, India, Japan and Europe treat issues of population planning with various levels of importance and apply different strategies. In China the issue of family planning, the new eugenics, the quality of the population and one-child policy are of great political and human significance. The one-child policy, widely practised since the late-1970s, in combination with a preference for males, has led to a levelling off the growth of the population. By legal prohibition the state has tried to interfere against these practices, but as yet not successfully. In India, too, sterilisation, infanticide and prenatal genetic diagnosis are closely followed by abortion have led to a population imbalance, in which the state tries to interfere. Japan and Europe, on the other hand, struggle with the problem of ageing population and falling levels of fertility.

Thus, a variety of genetic technologies are available to the state in policies aimed at raising the quantity of the population. Such population policies are part of an attempt to ‘improve’ the genetic composition of individuals or entire peoples. The 1993 introduction of the new eugenics legislation in China, for example, supports the systematic ‘implementation of pre-natal medical check-ups’ on hereditary, venereal or reproductive disorders as well as mental disorders so as to prevent ‘inferior births’ (Ministry of Public Health, 1994). A different tendency can be found in the Netherlands, where members of the medical profession observe that the state is obstructing their duty of providing all possible information and alternative treatments for patients by not allowing them to practice pre-embryo-screening and prenatal genetic research.

There is a need for the comparison of clashes of state population policies with local traditions in India, China, and Japan. Modern technologies of genetic engineering increasingly allow the government to intervene and regulate the personal lives of individuals in the name of public health, religion and national good. Concomitantly, concepts of health and human values in society are likely to be influenced. However, in some cultural environments, such as in India, it is the state that tries to put a brake on the prenatal gender selection of its population.

Genetic sampling and vulnerable groupings in genetic sampling sites

The twofold aims of this project are, first, to understand the socioeconomic and cultural conditions of genetic sampling and biobanking in India, China and Japan and, second, to the ways in which research populations are defined and mapped by researchers. The DNA of these socially defined groups is the subject of research in evolutionary genetics, the study of human reactions to various pharmaceutical products (pharmacogenetics), and the study of single nucleotide polymorphism (SNPs). ‘Two kinds of issues are central to this research. The first involves the biotechnical aspects of sampling and storing DNA. Current biotechnical protocols still fail to deal adequately with the specific conditions raised by population-based research, in particular regarding procedures for group decision-making and cultural diversity. The second involves problems inherent in the ways geneticists define sample populations in genetic research. Before the sampling of populations begins, estimates are made about the genetic nature of target populations. The contents of these estimates are intimately related to historical processes of ethnic group formation, the intricacies of cultural perception and political interests.

In India, China and Taiwan, the DNA of various minority groups with suspect unique DNA are exploited commercial by research groups abroad and at home. This has caused considerable local concern that looks at the ‘internationalization of the DNA’. In China, the DNA from a single individual, a native of southwest China, ethnic DNA of over 25 400-called national minorities is stored in the world’s largest ethnic data bank in Kunming (People’s Daily, 22/11/2002). Such research is used to support claims on ethnic and national identities, for example, to resolve conflict over national territory. Bio-anthropological research from South India served to provide genetic evidence for the similarity between high caste Indians and Europeans (Ramshad 2000). In Japan and China similar population research attempts to ‘scientifically’ root the modern nation in venerable historical origins.

Genomics, sociogenetic identities and health strategies in China, India and Japan

Though increased genetic information means a step forward in predicting and curing genetic diseases, policy-makers also attempt to use it strategically to improve human populations and eliminate ‘defective’ phenotypes. In the private sphere parallel developments are taking place: early prenatal testing has motivated couples with an increased risk of affected offspring to have children, but the diagnosis of disorders has also led to a steep increase of selective abortion. A central question here is if and when we can speak of a link between national health care policy, public debate and the private sphere. For instance, in China, the government started a one-child family policy in the 1970s to ensure sufficient nutrition for all new-borns, which resulted in a substantially decreased birth rate. At the same time, this policy limits individual freedom and autonomy. On the other hand, infanticide in China by the 1990s had become considerably lower than in India. The criteria for the cost-effectiveness of clinical genetics in developing countries are not the same as in wealthy countries, such as Japan, Singapore and Taiwan. In developing countries the severely handicapped do not usually survive and, if they do, they are not provided with expensive medical care. Consequently, the targets of genetic services are reached on the basis of a different balance sheet. Thus, in developing countries family planning, carrier testing, genetic counselling and prenatal diagnosis may have a different rationale.

Currently six researchers are working on SMAP. Focusing on reproductive genetic technologies (RGTs) and genetic counselling in Delhi and Mumbai in India, Dr Jyotsna Gupta studies how genetic screening affects the perception of genetic risk. To understand these processes, Gupta conducts fieldwork in hospital locations of diverging religious and socio-economic status. In her analysis, Gupta uses the categories of gender, religion, education and socio-economic status in understanding the parental decisions made to abort or to carry the embryo to full term. At the same time, she relates her observations in these clinics to state-regulation, developments in the pharmaceutical industry and international biotechnical guidelines and NGOs.

The application of RGTs in Japan and its effect on genetic selection after prenatal diagnosis and during pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) are central in the work of Dr Masae Kato. Her fieldwork focuses on the way parents make decisions about their offspring in genetic counselling sessions, and the way government guidelines, medical institutions, the family and cultural-medical practices affect these decisions. Kato relates her findings to political and public debates on the socio-cultural value of the embryo, so as to understand processes of validating humans. Initially, Kato will compare the application of RGTs in Japan with those in the Netherlands, extending the comparison to the PRC next.

Interested in genetic sampling, screening and biobanking in India, Prasanna Patra studies medical policies on three tribes with high levels of sickle cell anemia, whose socio-economic circumstances differ starkly, and investigates how screening affects the identity and health of the community. In general, Patra studies what happens to genetic data and asks the following questions: who does the sampling and under what conditions? Where are the data stored and who has access to them? Patra aims to make sense of the various behaviours and consequences of various interest groups, including academic researchers, pharmaceutical companies, state agencies, sampled communities and NGOs.

Two research students will start to work with us in September 2005. Suli Sui will conduct comparative research into the regulation of new genetic technologies regarding vulnerable populations. She reviews existing Chinese law in relation to gender, ethnicity, and socio-economic status, after which she will compare similar issues in the context of regulation of genomics and society in India. Apart from weighing arguments in favour and against the universal regulation of biotechnology, she will offer recommendations on regulations that harm the interests of identified vulnerable populations.

The second research student, Jan-Erik Leppanen, aims to understand the role of Chinese ethnic minorities in biobanking and hopes to gain a better understanding of the effects of the knowledge generated through genetic sampling. Apart from exploring how biobanking actions alter relations between ethnic groups and the state, and what commercial stakes are involved, this research tries to understand the social and cultural effects of these actions on the ethnic groups in question.

Note

1 Single nucleotide polymorphisms or SNPs (pronounced ‘snps’) are DNA sequence variations that occur when a single nucleotide (A, C, G or T) in the genome sequence is altered.

References


Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner (University of Amsterdam), who leads the programme, conducts research mainly in the areas of biobanking, stem cell research and genetic counselling in China and Japan.
Since the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, Indonesia’s Shi‘i minority has grown. An increasing number of Indonesian students pursue their Islamic studies in the hawza ‘ilmiiyya of Qum, the most prominent centre of Shi‘i Islamic education in the world. A Qum education enhances the reputations of Indonesian Shi‘i ustadhs (religious teachers) within their Shi‘i community. They play an important role in da‘wa (Islamic propagation), educational and cultural activities.

Increase of Indonesian students in Qum

It is not unusual when Indonesian students began to pursue Islamic education in Qum, but it is known that some did so several years before the Iranian revolution. Ayatollah Ibrahim Amini, for example, was the son of Muhammad Al-Habsyi and grandson of Habib Ali Kwitang of Jakarta, studied in Qum in 1974. Six graduates of Al-Batul (the Cultural Centre) in Central Sulawesi, followed over the next two years. In September 1976, Umar Shahab, an Arab descendant from Palembang, South Sumatra, and today a famous Shi‘i ustadh, came to Qum and he says, studied alongside seven other Indonesian students (Umar Shahah 1947). In his field-work in 1975, Fischer also noted the presence of Indonesian students in Qum; among foreign students, including those from Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Lebanon, Tanzania, Turkey, Negeria and Kashmir, Indonesians numbered the fewest. (Fischer 1980: 78).

Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, interaction between its government and Indonesian Shi‘i ulama has increased. The victory of ayatollahs inspired Indonesian intellectuals and ulama to study the ideological foundation of the Iranian revolution: Shi‘ism. At the same time, an ‘export-recruitment’ occurred, as Iranian leaders and ulama aimed to spread Shi‘ism in Indonesia and to attract Indonesian students to study Shi‘ism in Iran. In 1980 the Iranian government sent its representatives Ayatollah Ibrahim Amini, Ayatollah Masduqi, and Hujjat al-Islam Mahmodi to Indonesia. Among their activities was a visit to YAPI (Yayasan Pemrastan Islam, the Foundation of Islamic Education) of Bandung, East Java, where they met with its leader, Husein Al-Habsyi (1921-1994), who became the most important confidant of Indonesian leaders and ulama in Indonesia. At the time, Husein Al-Habsyi was probably one of the most prominent Shi‘i ulama in Indonesia and played a major role in the development of Islamic education in Indonesia. As a result of the meeting, Qum’s hawza ‘ilmiiyya agreed to accept ten Indonesian students selected by Husein Al-Habsyi. From then on till his death in 1994, Husein Al-Habsyi was responsible for selecting candidates for study at hawza ‘ilmiiyya in Qum and other cities in Iran. Many were gradu- ates of Al-Batul and other educational insti- tutions and must have become important Shi‘i ustadhs in Indonesia.

Thus the number of Indonesian stu- dents studying in Qum has increased significantly. By 1990, fifty Indonesian students had reportedly completed their studies or were still studying in Qum. Ten years later the number of Qum graduates in Indonesia was more than a hundred. In 2001, fifty Indonesian stu- dents were selected to continue their studies in Qum (Ali 2002: 201-204), and in 2004 I was informed, ninety more students were selected.

In addition to the growing interest of Indonesian students to study in Iran, the Iranian government, through its Inter- national Center for Islamic Studies (Markaz Jihahi-e Ulema Islamii: ICIS), has stepped up efforts to attract interna- tional students. Since 1994 ICIS has been under the supervision of the office of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution headed by the Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who also appointed its director.

The education system of hawza ‘ilmiiyya

There are two educational systems in the hawza ‘ilmiiyya in Qum: the traditional system, which is the most famous and influential, and the modern system. The traditional system’s curriculum includes both transmitted and intellectual reli- gious sciences. Each subject has its own standard texts (Nasr 1987: 165-183), which are studied in halaqat (study cir- cles) under an ayatollah’s supervision. The educational programme is com- posed of three levels: muqaddamat (pre- liminary), sunnat (external) and dars al- kharaj (graduation class) or halaqat (graduation research) (Momen 1983). The three levels have to be completed by every mujtahid, a religious scholar who has achieved the level of competence nec- essary to make religious decisions based on reason from the principal sources of Islam. When a student receives the ijaza (degree) that makes him a mujtahid, the hono- rific title ayatollah (jatil Allah, ‘sign of God’) is usually bestowed upon him. An ayatollah recognised as a ‘mujtahid al- taqaddal, meaning an authoritative source in matters of Islamic law, usually receives the title ayatollah al-‘izma (grand ayat-ollah). The common title of an aspiring mujtahid is hujjat al-Islam (proof of Islam). The structure of Shi‘i ulama is pyramidal; those of the highest level, the grand ayatollah, are the fewest in num- ber. The traditional system of education is extremely important in Shi‘i society, given the major role of mujtahid al-taqaddal throughout history.

The modern madrasa system is a trans- formation of the classical system, adopt- ing the modern system of education in terms of graduation, curriculum, class- room learning and rules. Non-tradi- tional madrasas ‘are set to serve up needs not supplied by the traditional sys- tem’ (Fischer 1980: 81). The curriculum consists of religious and secular sci- ences presented through a slightly sim- plified version of traditional study cours- es. Unlike the traditional system, this modern madrasa system is not inten- tioned to train students to become muj- tabahs, but rather to become Islamic scholars and missionaries. This innova- tive type of education has provided an alternative for students who, for what- ever reason, cannot follow the tradi- tional system in the hawza ‘ilmiiyya. International students, including Indonesian students, are provided with this modern type of programme.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has made educational innovations in Qum’s hawza ‘ilmiiyya through the above-men- tioned ICIS, which coordinates pro- grammes for foreign students, assigns students to madrasas, and monitors their needs within the framework of dis- seminating Islamic knowledge and teachings globally. ICIS has organised innovative programmes based on the modern madrasa system for interna- tional students. The Madrasa Imam Khomeini, for example, offers pro- grammes based on grade systems that include undergraduate and graduate lev- els. It also presents the tertiary education of the modern educational system. Such innovation takes Qum’s hawza ‘ilmiiyya a step closer to becoming a leading inter- national centre of Islamic learning.

Every year an ICIS representative con- ducts a selection process at such Islamic institutions in order to select a roster of Jakarta and the Muthahhari Foun- dation in Bandung. In addition to aca- demic achievement, Arabic is requisite, as it is an international language for Islamic learning and the language of instruction at certain madrasas in Qum. At the same time, upon their arrival in Iran, students are also required to follow a six-month training programme in Per- sian, the language of instruction at most Qum’s Islamic educational institutions.

Educational institutions attended by Indonesian students

Both educational systems have been attended by Indonesian students. The first group of Indonesian students were enrolled at Dar al-Talib al-Islami (Madrasa Hujjatiyya) founded in 1965 by Ayatollah Muhammad Kazim Shar- ratmadani (1904-1987). As an institution of Islamic learning, Dar al-Talib was known for its foreign students and for arranging their visas and residence per- mits. It organised a five-year programme with a credit system (Fischer 1980: 82) and a curriculum that included both reli- gious knowledge and secular sciences such as psychology, philosophy, sociolo- gy, mathematics and English. The lan- guage of instruction was Arabic. Thus, its educational system was modern; it did not follow the traditional system of learn- ing even though it was strongly entrenched in the traditional hawza sys- tem (Umar Shahab, interview 9/1/2003). After the dissolution of Dar al-Talib in 1981, owing to its leader’s opposition to the concept of awlāf al-‘ilmā (‘man- date of the jurist’) instituted by Khomeini, the Islamic Republic of Iran began to provide the same programme for for- eign students. Since 1981 nearly all Indonesian students who have come to Iran attended Madrasa Hujjatiyya, including Indonesian ustadhs. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s Shi‘i ustadh Husein Shahab, who was trans- ferred to this madrasa after he had stud- ied for two years at the Dar al-Talib. Unlike Dar al-Talib, the Madrasa Husay- jatiyya follows the traditional system of education generally used in the hawza ‘ilmiiyya. The majority of Indonesian stu- dents who become Shi‘i ustadhs only completed the preliminary level.

Recently, along with the educational reform in Qum, a large number of young Indonesian students have registered at the Madrasa Imam Khomeini, which provides a modern system of education for Indonesian ustadh who can pursue undergraduate or graduate programmes and choose a specialisation.

Early Qum alumni, such as Umar Sha- hab and Husein Shahab, have become very prominent Shi‘i figures and have contributed to the development of Islamic education and culture in Indonesia. Given ongoing educational innovations in Qum and Indonesians’ growing interest in them, Qum alumni might very well influence the future development of Islamic discourse in Indonesia.
The Heart of Borneo: a challenge for social scientists

Nature conservation projects must contend with (illegal) logging, poaching, encroaching farmers, the trans-border trade of wildlife, and timber and local communities that question the protected status of areas. Anthropologists’ professional code of ethics states that the studied group must never suffer from the research when there are conflicts of interest – the people must come first. Does this imply that anthropologists cannot contribute to nature conservation because their science serves a social purpose?

The success of such conservation areas depends largely on the support of the involved countries to engage in such large multinational protected areas, but equally important is the willingness of lower level governments to live up to the expectations of these conservation areas and local communities with external organisations aiming to conserve biodiversity are also relevant. These encounters often lead to frustrations about unfulfilled promises, inadequate compensation for income losses and diminishing interest of conservation organizations after a limited number of years.

Social scientists studying nature conservation emphasize the human element. Anthropologists focus on the social and cultural complexity of an area. They describe, from a political ecological point of view, stakeholders’ interests in a particular natural resource or a particular part of a forest or sea, and shed light on the tensions (ethnic, social, political, economic) that arise from the power play over control of natural resources. In most cases, the anthropologist’s main informants are local people. It is their land that conservations are in business to protect. Granting that there are challenges to the rhetoric of the indigenous peoples’ movement (see Kuper 2003), the conclusions of many social science studies on conservation practices are clear: conservation organizations have been “increasingly excluding, from full involvement in their programmes, the indigenous and traditional peoples living in the territories the conservationists were trying to protect” (Chapin 2004:17). Organizations such as World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Conservation International (CI) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC), build their projects on the basis of cooperation with local communities. The NGO’s projects are rarely a decade or so it became clear, that the so-called ‘ecological noble savage’ does not exist. These local communities often turn out not to be sustainable users of the environment, sometimes due to circumstances beyond their control.

According to the anthropologists’ professional ethical code, the group under research is not to suffer by the research, especially not through information passed on to third parties, and when there is a conflict of interest, these individuals must come first. Because of this, anthropologists encountering local practices that are harmful to the environment can find themselves in a dilemma when the local community is told by outsiders (government representatives, conservationists) to change it. However, this does not imply that it is impossible for anthropologists to play a role in research supporting nature conservation projects, as became clear during the Heart of Borneo Conference last April. Many anthropologists and other social scientists have been involved in research among people living in the Heart of Borneo. The high turnover of social scientists and the dedication shown in their work gives hope for the future. Contributions could be made by bridging the gap between the local population (their way of life, their perceptions towards nature, their projected futures) and the world of conservationists (their aims, their perceptions and perspectives). And, as one presenter put it, environmental conservation should not just be about the environment. It should be about what alternative sources of income, law enforcement, compensation payments, and campaigns will bring to these communities, not just at the height of the campaign, but over a more extended period of time. For this, the knowledge and experience of the social sciences is indispensable.

References

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The Heart of Borneo Conference

A new round of WWF’s campaign for the Heart of Borneo to protect one of the largest intact rainforest areas in the world with extremely rich biodiversity. Two conferences were held in early 2005, the first in Brunei, which had largely political and diplomatic goals, and the second in London and The Hague with more scientific aims. The latter was organized in collaboration with the Institute of Environmental Studies (CML, Leiden University) and IIAS. A selection of conference papers will be published by ‘Troubador International’.

The Heart of Borneo Conference

The Heart of Borneo Conference

Towards social stability and democratic governance in Central Eurasia: challenges to regional security

In the current world system Central Eurasia may seem peripheral with its poor socio-economic indicators, particularistic tendencies in politics and intensified ethnic conflicts. However, its geo-strategic location and natural resources – among them the large hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian Sea – may return its historical centrality to the region. This new ‘centrality’ of Central Eurasia brings new threats. Repressive political regimes and marginalisation of whole groups of population inflicts conflicts that spill across national borders. Migration to Europe, both legal and illegal, is the direct outcome of social-economic destabilization in the region.

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The book, consisting of a number of review essays and presentation papers resulting from the workshop, provides an analysis of existing knowledge and discussions in the field of security studies on Central Eurasia. It sheds light on the national security, students and all intellectuels outside academia, who are interested in the rapidly changing geopolitical arrangements, economic and socio-political realities in Central Eurasia.

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The announced publication is the result of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) ‘New Security Challenges in Central Eurasia: challenges to regional security which took place in Leiden, 8-11 September 2004’. Scholars of many backgrounds from different theoretical and interdisciplinary perspectives addressed the historical and social legacy of Central Eurasian societies and current risks such as nationalism, separatism, ethnic conflict and the consequences of marginalisation, and the ability of regional governments and elites to deal with these threats. The workshop was organized as co-directors Wim Stokhof and Irina Morozova (IIAS) and funded by the NATO Science Programme, NWO, Leiden University, CML, Erasmus University, and IIAS. For further info see www.caao.nl/iias/ideas/040905/.

Contributors: Andrey Fursov, Jacques Legrand, Catherine Paujol, Irina Morozova, Alysh Hishamou, Paul Cazee, Robert Culler, Michael Kaiser, Leonard Friedman, Martin Spechler, Elena Sadovskaya, Nazim Imamov, Nina Dyudorova, Farhid Tolipov.

Irina Morozova is IIAS affiliated fellow working on the modern history of Central and Inner Asia, communist societies in Asia, and comparative studies on the post-Cold War transformation of Central Eurasia.

Book announcement
Towards social stability and democratic governance in Central Eurasia: challenges to regional security

In the current world system Central Eurasia may seem peripheral with its poor socio-economic indicators, particularistic tendencies in politics and intensified ethnic conflicts. However, its geo-strategic location and natural resources – among them the large hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian Sea – may return its historical centrality to the region. This new ‘centrality’ of Central Eurasia brings new threats. Repressive political regimes and marginalisation of whole groups of population inflicts conflicts that spill across national borders. Migration to Europe, both legal and illegal, is the direct outcome of social-economic destabilization in the region.
Illegal but licit: transnational flows and permissive polities in Asia

Some transnational practices are considered acceptable (licit) by participants while they are illegal in a formal sense. A new research programme focuses on flows of poor people and goods across international borders in Asia - movements that are not allowed by states but are not ‘organised crime’ either. States declare these practices illegal and yet states themselves are often involved.

Globalization and transnationalism, although certainly not new, have become more prominent over the past few decades, resulting in worldwide movements of capital, goods, and people. The proliferation of these international flows has been framed in the conceptual and material context of the modern nation state. Consciously and unconsciously, we imagine that our state territories as its natural units of study, and we are accustomed to academic specializations such as the sociology of states, international relations, it is no surprise that the field of knowledge that seeks to understand the world beyond the state, international relations, therefore focuses on the state as its foundational unit of analysis. By highlighting the importance of movement across state boundaries in understanding the causal mechanisms that link the state and its institutions to the gap between our reliance on analytical categories that presuppose social fixity and the mobile practices and phenomena we are observing. This research programme explores the limitations of ‘seeing like a state’. It adopts a perspective that privileges participants in international activities, leading us to different understandings of transnational movement. It focuses especially on a theme rarely highlighted in the study of transnational practices: the interface of legality and illegality. In the absence of a sovereign legal authority it is impossible to distinguish, in an objective and timeless way, between the legal and the illegal in flows of people and commodities across international borders. What passes for ‘international crime’ is so closely intertwined with the domestic-legal that for analytical purposes it is necessary to distinguish between ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’. Since there is no legitimate and sovereign legal authority at the global level, the law always refers to the domestic sphere: to states. But when we shift our focus from the domestic sphere to the international sphere, we are able to see new forms of knowledge that advance the understanding of global relations in a way that is not simply reductionist. By doing so, we can see the limits of both the domestic and the global.

The programme argues that methodologically the social sciences have been limited by a perspective that focuses on movement and it seeks to develop new tools to understand transnational movements. Taking a comparative perspective, the research programme examines transnational flows across Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Israel and Dubai), focusing on participants’ identities and notions of (il)legality and (il)licitness. It seeks to develop a comparative and interdisciplinary approach and to produce new methods for studying transnational practices.

The programme supports research on the margins of and beyond the state, international relations, and to produce new methods for studying transnational flows of people and goods that are illegal but licit and their relationship with policy-making and states.

Four cases

The projects within the research programme share a regional focus on Asia: Bangladesh, home to most of humanity and a long history of complex transnational connectivity. Building on academic contacts and interviews, the programme aims to map the legal and political ways of understanding transnational flows of people and goods that are illegal but licit and their relationship with policy-making and states.

Labour migration between China and Israel: playing the system

This project, co-supervised by Li Minghuang (China), Yitzhak Shichor (Israel) and Liv Dew (The Netherlands), focuses on Chinese migrant workers recruited to work in Israel under legal contracts. Upon arrival, migrant workers often find that the contracts are not adhered to and they are immediately faced with a situation of illegality. Many of these contracts are honored by workers who are employer as well as a better paying illegal jobs are offered in the Gulf. Despite their illegal status, they are usually allowed to continue working, even for long periods of time. The main purpose of this project is to look at regimes of illegality/licitness: the regimes that migrants find themselves in various stages of their migration, what dangers and risks these regimes imply, how these regimes are maintained and how the migrants play the system. Our hypothesis is that when the regimes are maintained well as their labour brokers, employers and the Israeli and Chinese states benefit from maintaining illegal employment, and that it is the perception of regime insecurity that incites and/of Chinese official discourse on illegal labour migration varies; making certain illegal activities legal and vice versa. Research will be conducted in South India (Kerala and Dubai), which has longstanding trade relations with Kerala. Dubai now has a labour force that is over 95 percent foreign (Indians are the largest group), and Indian domestic workers and other foreigners. Co-supervised by Rima Suhban (United Arab Emirates), Pravena Kodith (India), Annalies Moores (The Netherlands) and Mario Rutten (The Netherlands), the project investigates the living strategies of poor Korean women in transnational work in order to understand (il)legal-(il)licit practices in transnational labour cycles.

Notes


2. Ludden David. 2003. ‘Presidential Address: The Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO).’

Books received

General


East Asia


China

Japan


South Asia


Netherlands


Europe


Indonesia


Orientalia


Economic growth in China’s agricultural sector lags behind growth in industry and services, creating an ever-widening rural-urban income gap. Yet growth beyond the farm offers new opportunities for farmers in China’s more advanced provinces: markets for new crops and increasing farm size. At present, the dual government objectives of increasing rural incomes and increasing rice production are partially in conflict. Farmers can only make money from non-farm wages only when they stop rice cultivation and switch to more profitable crops. Otherwise, mechanization is necessary to allow large enough increases in farm size to raise household income and maintain national rice production levels.

China’s spectacular urban growth offers new opportunities for farmers. Rural-urban migration creates markets for more expensive products, such as vegetables, fruits and meat. Diversification of agriculture from rice to these high-value products is considered an important means to increase farmers’ income and thereby prevent further widening of the rural-urban income gap. However, diversification might jeopardize national rice supply, which remains a concern of the government.

Calibrating the farm household

The study uses a farm household model to examine the potential of urbanization to spur the development of rice-based farming systems. Taking into account the dual government objective of increasing farm income and rice production, it also assesses the effects of the expansion of land holdings, crop diversification, and technology. The socio-economic, institutional and natural environments determine the direction and pace of change for farm households and, hence, overall agricultural development. To account for these diverse influences on land use, the farm household model integrates knowledge from economic, soil science and crop science.

We developed a stylized model that covers the core characteristics of these households and maximizes income from crop production, subject to the availability of land, family labour and capital, agricultural technology and market prices. The model can accommodate five different rice varieties. We test three prevailing rice systems: one annual harvest of rice using hybrid seed rice; two rice harvests a year, the first an inbred rice variety and the second hybrid seed; two rice harvests a year with hybrid seed rice. All rice crops are transplanting, except early cut rice with non-hybrid seeds. In addition, rice is grown on the three prevailing rice systems: celery-greens-radish and celery-hot pepper-radish.

Internally, we assume that all operations are performed manually, as was common practice among farmers surveyed. Later, we introduce mechanization in order to meet peak labour demands, a practice that is becoming increasingly popular. For vegetable production, the main labour peak occurs during the harvest. In summary, the model accurately simulates the shift from pure vegetable production to a combination of vegetable and rice production when farm size increases. The reason behind this shift is limited labour availability during peak periods.

Mechanization scenario

When we allow mechanization and double the rice farm size that a single household can manage becomes as large as 12 ha (Figure 1). Even with mechanization, labour constraints limit vegetable cultivation to a maximum of almost 0.5 ha. When farm size increases, land area for vegetable decreases slightly to free up labour for increasing labour-intensive rice cultivation, until virtually all 12 ha is used for directly seeded, mechanized single rice. A similar pattern can be observed for a rice farmer who starts with non-mechanized double rice cultivation and beyond one hectare shifts to less labour-intensive rice crops until he ends up with 12 ha of single rice of which most is mechanized and directly seeded. Hence, from two or three hectares onwards, both farms become very similar. The main difference is that up to 12 ha, the mixed farm maintains a small vegetable plot, which leads to somewhat lower per hectare rice production but significantly higher income. Mechanization is already preferred for vegetable production at a farm size of 0.6 ha, but rice cultivation is mechanized only slightly beyond 1.8 ha on the rice farm and 2.4 ha on the mixed farm.

Mechanization: good for rice, irrelevant to vegetables

The spectacular growth of China’s non-farm economy offers new opportunities for farmers in China’s more advanced provinces. Increased income in the urban sector creates markets for new products, and migrating farmers rent their land to those staying behind. Using a simulation model covering important characteristics of the farmer and his context, we analyse the effects of potential increases in farm size given the farmer’s choice to grow rice only or a combination of vegetables and vegetables. The methodology employed allows exploration of the impacts of expected future developments on agricultural production and rural livelihoods.

Our results show that at the present scale of farming, the dual government objectives of increasing rural incomes and increasing rice production are clearly conflicting. At the present land to labour ratio, rice production renders a per capita income that is less than a quarter of the non-farm wage. Vegetable production, however, obtains five times the rice income and thus can more than compete with the non-farm sector. Specialized training and development of product markets can help farmers currently growing rice to switch to these more profitable crops. If, as expected, farm size increases in the near future, rising rural incomes and rice production might go hand in hand. Even with mechanization, farmers can only manage relatively small plots of vegetables. Our results indicate that household and the limited amount of available hired labour is just enough to specialize in vegetable production at the current land to labour ratio. Simulations show that when farm size increases, labour constraints during vegetable harvest forces house to grow rice on the additional land. Mechanization will help farmers to cultivate larger land areas and thus generate more income, but it does not greatly increase land area for vegetables, as the main peak area of vegetable harvest cannot be mechanized.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rice farm</th>
<th>Vegetable farm</th>
<th>Mixed farm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crops allowed</td>
<td>only rice</td>
<td>all crops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm size (ha)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family labour (full-time labourers)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results (annual basis)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (Yuan)</td>
<td>2,616</td>
<td>16,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working capital (Yuan)</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>1,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice production (kg)</td>
<td>3,590</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable area (ha)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land allocation for the rice farm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land area (ha)</td>
<td>single rice</td>
<td>double rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1

Simulation of increasing farm size from 0 to 12 ha with steps of 0.6 ha for the two reference farms allowing for mechanization

Land allocation for the mixed farm

Land area (ha) | single rice | double rice | mixed rice |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.3</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>12</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This article is a short version of a full paper presented at the First Asia-Europe Workshop on Sustainable Resource Management and Policy Options for Rice Ecosystems (SUMAPOL) held from 11 to 14 May 2005 in Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China. The full paper is considered for publication in an Agricultural Systems special issue on technology and policy options for rice ecosystems in a rapidly changing global environment.
Asia Alliance

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is a cooperative framework of
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IIAS
(Institut Indonesian Alliance)
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Call for Proposals


The European Alliance for Asian Studies and the Asia–Europe Foundation welcome proposals for workshops on themes of common interest to Asia and Europe, to take place in 2006/2007.

In November 2004 the members of the European Alliance for Asian Studies in close co-operation with the Asia–Europe Foundation (ASEF) in Singapore, issued a call for workshops for the annual Asia–Europe Workshop Series to take place in the academic year 2005/2006.

The objective of the Workshop Series is to stimulate researchers from Asia and Europe to work together on themes of common interest to Asia and Europe. The criteria are: 1. the quality of the proposal, 2. joint organization of the workshop by an institute from Asia and Europe, 3. participants shall be selected from at least eight different ASEF member countries.

In this fourth tranche of the Annual Asia–Europe Workshop Series, 33 proposals have been received and referred by the Asia–Europe Selection Committee. The following six have been selected for implementation:

1-3 September 2005
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Asian and European Foreign Direct Investment in the Chinese and Southeast Asian Automotive and Electronics Industries
Yuri Sadi, Faculty of Economics, Meijo University, Japan
R B P M. Busser, Faculty of Arts, Leiden University, the Netherlands

30 November - 2 December 2005
Centre for Khmer Studies, Cambodia
Water in Mainland Southeast Asia
Phumena, Centre for Khmer Studies, Cambodia
Barend Jan Tenveel, Hamburg University, Germany

5-7 January 2006
National University of Singapore, Singapore
Pensions on the move: Social security and trans-border retirement migration in Asia and Europe
Mika Toyota, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore
Anita Böcker, Institute for the Sociology of Law, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, the Netherlands

5-7 September 2006
Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, the Netherlands
Yinghua Wang, Beijing Normal University, China
Jingce Wang, School of Economics, Leiden University, the Netherlands

The deadline is 1 February 2006. Proposals will be refereed by the Asia–Europe Selection Committee, six will be selected for realization. Applicants will be informed of the Committee’s decision by mid-2006.

Financial support, up to a maximum of €12,500 per workshop, consists of contribution towards travel and accommodation.

Criteria

• Theme: one clear, original theme
• Call for Proposals

Deadline and Address

Deadline for submission of proposals is 1 February 2006.

Address for hand delivery or private courier service: IIAS, Nonningstien 1-3, 2311 V. London, The Netherlands

For more information www.asia-alliance.org and www.aeews.asef.org

Alliance update

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The annual Asia Europe Workshop Series

The annual Asia Europe Workshop Series seeks to create an intellectual environment that provides the opportunity for dialogue between senior experts and promising junior researchers of Asian and European civil societies. The Series is funded by the Asia–Europe Foundation (ASEF) in Singapore, issued a call for workshops for the annual Asia–Europe Workshop Series to take place in the academic year 2005/2006. The objective of the Workshop Series is to stimulate researchers from Asia and Europe to work together on themes of common interest to Asia and Europe. The criteria are: 1. the quality of the proposal, 2. joint organization of the workshop by an institute from Asia and Europe, 3. participants should be selected from at least eight different ASEF member countries.

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Asian Studies. Its partners are:

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For more information www.asia-alliance.org and www.aeews.asef.org
Postponed deadline

Satellites, applications, Socio-economics and regulatory regimes

Second Asian space conference 8-11 November 2005 Hanoi Vietnam

Deadline for paper submission: 15 October 2005

Authors who cannot meet this deadline are requested to bring five copies of their paper to the conference.

information: iias@let.leidenuniv.nl

Skyscrapers and sledgehammers: urban renewal in China

IIAS Annual Lecture 2005 18 November Amsterdam, the Netherlands ‘The Generic City is on its way from hori-

zontality to verticality. The skyscraper looks as if it will be the final, definitive typology. It has swallowed everything else. It can exist anywhere: in a rice field, or downtown - it makes no difference anymore. The towers no longer stand together; they are spaced so that they don’t interact. Density in iso-

lation is the ideal’ - Rem Koolhaas in S.M.L.XI

Rem Koolhaas, Pritzker Architecture Prize-

winner, is the main speaker for the IIAS Annual Lecture 2005. Koolhaas is a lead-

ing architect, theorist and writer. His ideas on the ‘generic city’, the general urban condition, are ever more applicable for contemporary Asian cities. The urban explosion in Asia has created cities that can hardly be distinguished; cities without identity, without history, without centre. But, as Koolhaas claims, ‘if you look close-

ly you can perform another reading - you can see, for instance, that these copies are dealing differently with layering and with problems of density.’ In this lecture Rem Koolhaas will discuss these issues in rela-

tion to the urban condition in China, where he is currently working on his largest project to date: the new head-

quarters for China Central Television (CCTV).

After the lecture a panel of international specialists (Prof. Xing Ruan, Prof. Shiling Zheng and Dr Anne-Marie Broudehoux) will discuss contemporary urban devel-

opments in China.

information: Lena Scheen l.scheen@let.leidenuniv.nl

Visions of Hindu kingship in the twilight of Mughal rule

13th Gonda Lecture Speaker: Monika Boehm-Tettelbach 25 November 2005 Amsterdam, the Netherlands At the turn of the eighteenth century, fol-

lowing the decline of the Mughal Empire, Hindu states re-defined the foundations of their rule, the concept of Hindu dhar-

ma. Bhakti groups had, for some two cen-

turies, been defining what, to them, were the content and societal implications of religion. They did this in ways that were often seen as threatening to tradi-
tional concepts of proper religious and public demeanour. This was felt to erode the very basis of Hindu statecraft, and therefore needed to be redressed.

The state of Sawai Jai singh (1705-1743) sought to define a Vaisnavism san

ktana dharma and those of Hindu dharma and those of

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The state of Sawai Jai singh (1705-1743) sought to define a Vaisnavism san
katananda dharma and those of Hindu dharma and those of modern colonial dharmas and those of the ensuing colonial period will be drawn. Monika Boehm-Tettelbach (author’s name: Monika Horstmann) is Professor in Modern South Asian Studies (Lan-

guages and Literatures) at the South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg, and head of the department. She is interested in Hindu religion in its literary as well as historical and political aspects, mainly in northern India. Her books include Dâlî Lieder (1991) and in Favour of Covindâsî: Historical Documents Relating to a Deity of Vindoban and Eastern Rajputan (1999). She is currently writing a book entitled An der Wende der Zeit. Herrschaftskonzept und Religion bei Sawai Jai singh.

Information: voorschlichting@bureau.knaw.nl

Fellowships at the International Institute for Asian Studies

IIAS invites postdoctoral researchers to apply for fellowships in Leiden or Amsterdam.

The institute focuses on the interdisciplinary and comparative study of Asia in the humanities and social sciences, and their interaction with other sciences. IIAS research covers South, East, Southeast and Central Asia. IIAS Fellows are offered office facilities, while the institute will mediate in gaining access to libraries, archives and other institutions in the Netherlands. Fellows may be asked to give a lecture or organise a workshop, remain in contact with European researchers, and make due reference to IIAS in (future) publications, (partly) made possible through research done during your stay.

IIAS has five categories of fellowships for researchers:

• Affiliated fellows
• Research fellows (upon vacancy only)
• Senior fellows
• IIAS professors (upon vacancy only)
• Artists in residence

IIAS fellowship applications can be submitted at any time. Vacancies are announced in the IIAS Newsletter and on the website.

For more information and an IIAS fellowship application form see the IIAS website at: www.iias.nl

For specific information, please contact Lena Scheen or Wouter Feldberg at: iiass Fellowships@iias.nl
the Institute of Asian Affairs in Hamburg is publishing three well-established academic journals focused on current developments in East Asia. Dedicated to further improving the scholarly standard, each journal has established an editorial board of internationally acknowledged academics and introduced new editorial formats. Focusing on both sound and up-to-date information and scholarly analysis of current affairs in Asia the reader now benefits from peer-reviewed articles, analytical commentaries and documentation of current affairs. The editors welcome contributions that are concerned with the fields of international relations, politics, economics, society, education, environment or law.

www.duei.de/ifa
**International conference agenda**

**IIAS Newsletter | #38 | September 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 - 11 November 2005</td>
<td>Stanford, USA</td>
<td>\textit{Law and order in the Japanese empire 1895-1945} organized by NIAS and Gothenburg University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 October 2005</td>
<td>Manila, Philippines</td>
<td>\textit{Agricultural and rural development in Asia: young people training} organized by IIAS and Center for Asia Pacific Women in Politics (CAPWIP) <a href="http://www.capwip.org/">www.capwip.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - 8 October 2005</td>
<td>Amsterdam, the Netherlands</td>
<td>\textit{Takako Ueta, University of Tokyo} <a href="http://nias.ku.dk/activities/conferences/default.htm">http://nias.ku.dk/activities/conferences/default.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 - 18 October 2005</td>
<td>Jakarta, Indonesia</td>
<td>\textit{War Documentation and Robert Cribb, Australian National University} contact: Project bureau Indonesia across Orders <a href="mailto:indie-indonesie@niod.nl">indie-indonesie@niod.nl</a> <a href="http://www.indie-indonesie.nl">www.indie-indonesie.nl</a></td>
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<td>27 - 29 October 2005</td>
<td>Yangzhou, China</td>
<td>\textit{Poetry reading and seminar on Malay-Asian Literature} organized by IIAS and the scholarly network Yangzhou Club <a href="http://www.shuoshu.org">www.shuoshu.org</a></td>
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| 20 - 22 October 2005  | Amsterdam, the Netherlands |\textit{Skyscrapers and sledgehammers: urban renewal in China} organized by IIAS and GISTDA, IIASL and ITC
<p>| 3 - 5 November 2005   | New Delhi, India   |\textit{Understanding India} Political reformes in Korea: personal reflections organized by the Asia-Europe Foundation in East and South Asia |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Event</th>
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<td>Singapore</td>
<td>25 - 27 June 2006</td>
<td>Achieving equity</td>
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<td>Bangkok, Thailand</td>
<td>5 - 7 January 2006</td>
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<td>and Europe</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>27 - 29 March 2006</td>
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<td>Chiang Mai, Thailand</td>
<td>26 - 29 June 2006</td>
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<td>Wollongong, Australia</td>
<td>8 - 10 December 2005</td>
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<td>Siem Reap, Cambodia</td>
<td>8 - 10 December 2005</td>
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<td>11 - 12 January 2006</td>
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<td>11 - 12 January 2006</td>
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<td>12 - 14 January 2006</td>
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<td>17 - 20 December 2005</td>
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<td>Buenos Aires, Argentina</td>
<td>24 - 26 August 2005</td>
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<td>Hong Kong, China</td>
<td>29 - 30 May 2006</td>
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<td>17 - 20 December 2005</td>
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<td>Buon Ma Thuot, Vietnam</td>
<td>19 December 2005</td>
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<td>29 - 30 May 2006</td>
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<td>26 - 28 April 2006</td>
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<td>12 - 14 January 2006</td>
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<td>16 - 18 December 2005</td>
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